Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?
Stephen Yelderman†
As a general rule, judges and scholars believe settlement is a good thing. But
for nearly a century, the Supreme Court has said that patent litigation is categorically different, since it offers the chance to increase competition by freeing the public
from the burdens of a monopoly. Based on this theory, and in the hopes of seeing
more patent litigation fought to completion, the Court has overturned long-standing
common-law doctrines, declined to enforce otherwise-valid contracts, and—in the
recent case of Federal Trade Commission v Actavis, Inc—subjected patent settlements to scrutiny under the antitrust laws. Similar reasoning has resulted in legislative initiatives to encourage patent challenges, including the regulatory bounty for
challenging pharmaceutical patents included in the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act and
the administrative review procedures created by the 2011 America Invents Act.
Moreover, scholars continue to call for reforms to provoke additional patent challenges, again asserting their supposed procompetitive benefits.
This Article is the first to seriously scrutinize the claim that patent challenges
lead to increased competition. It identifies a number of conditions that must hold for
a patent challenge to provide this particular benefit, and evaluates the reasonableness of assuming that the procompetitive benefits of patent challenges are generally
available. As it turns out, there are a number of ways these conditions can and regularly do fail. This Article synthesizes legal doctrine, recent empirical scholarship,
and several novel case studies to identify categories of challenges in which the potential benefits for competition are smaller than previously thought or, in some cases,
completely unavailable.
This analysis has a number of implications for patent law and policy. First, it
provides guidance for how the Patent Office should administer its new review authority under the America Invents Act. Second, it exposes weaknesses in judicially
created policies intended to encourage more patent challenges. Third, it vindicates
the present scope of the regulatory bounties provided under the Hatch-Waxman Act
and cautions against recently proposed expansions of these incentives to other technology areas. Fourth, it sheds new light on the competitive consequences of patent
settlements, and thus informs how the Court’s recent Actavis decision should be applied in future cases.
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If there be an issue more troublesome, or more apt for litigation than
this, we are not aware of it.
Judge Learned Hand1
INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, courts and commentators agree that settlement is a good thing. As the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure has observed, settlement “eases crowded court dockets
and results in savings to the litigants and the judicial system,”
and so “should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as
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Harries v Air King Products Co, 183 F2d 158, 162 (2d Cir 1950).
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possible.”2 While some have argued otherwise,3 the prevailing
view today is that the costs of litigation typically outweigh its advantages, and that litigants should be allowed—encouraged,
even—to resolve their differences as swiftly as possible.4
But patent litigation is different. Alone among the many civil
causes one might think produce public benefits—such as environmental litigation, First Amendment challenges, RICO suits, and
so on—patent disputes are the class of civil litigation singled out
by courts as requiring a departure from the ordinary principle of
encouraging settlement.5 Why? Because, as the Supreme Court
explained in 1945, “a patent is an exception to the general rule
against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open
market.”6 As such, patent litigation implicates the public’s “paramount interest” in ensuring that patents are “free from fraud or
2

FRCP 16(c), Advisory Committee Note to the 1983 Amendments.
See, for example, Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L J 1073, 1075 (1984);
Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Nonparty Involvement in Settlements?, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 221, 222–23 (1999).
4
See Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, 476 US 267, 305 (1986) (Marshall dissenting) (“[C]ivil rights litigation is no exception to the general policy in favor of settlements.”); United States v Davis, 261 F3d 1, 27 (1st Cir 2001), quoting United States v
Comunidades Unidas contra la Contaminacion, 204 F3d 275, 280 (1st Cir 2000) (observing
a “strong public policy in favor of settlements, particularly in very complex and technical
regulatory contexts”); Doe v Delie, 257 F3d 309, 322 (3d Cir 2001) (“The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions and other complex cases, to conserve judicial resources
and reduce parties’ costs.”); Flex–Foot, Inc v CRP, Inc, 238 F3d 1362, 1369 (Fed Cir 2001),
quoting Hemstreet v Spiegel, Inc, 851 F2d 348, 350 (Fed Cir 1988) (“[T]here is a compelling
public interest and policy in upholding and enforcing settlement agreements voluntarily
entered into because enforcement of settlement agreements encourages parties to enter
into them—thus fostering judicial economy.”) (quotation marks omitted); Lederman, 75
Notre Dame L Rev at 222 (cited in note 3) (summarizing reasons for preferring settlement).
5
See Federal Trade Commission v Actavis, Inc, 133 S Ct 2223, 2239 (2013) (Roberts
dissenting) (“[The parties’ patent settlement] put an end to litigation that had been dragging on for three years. Ordinarily, we would think this a good thing.”). For discussion of
the public interest in patent litigation, see Pope Manufacturing Co v Gormully, 144 US
224, 233–36 (1892); Standard Water Systems Co v Griscom–Russell Co, 278 F 703, 705 (3d
Cir 1922); Kellogg Co v National Biscuit Co, 305 US 111, 122 (1938); Aero Spark Plug Co
v B.G. Corp, 130 F2d 290, 293 (2d Cir 1942) (Frank concurring); Mercoid Corp v Midcontinent Investment Co, 320 US 661, 666 (1944); United States v United States Gypsum
Co, 333 US 364, 387–88 (1948); Hieger v Ford Motor Co, 516 F2d 1324, 1327 (6th Cir 1975);
Schlegel Manufacturing Co v USM Corp, 525 F2d 775, 781 (6th Cir 1975); Cardinal Chemical Co v Morton International, Inc, 508 US 83, 100 (1993); Benitec Australia, Ltd v Nucleonics,
Inc, 495 F3d 1340, 1350 (Fed Cir 2007) (Dyk dissenting); Medtronic, Inc v Mirowski Family
Ventures, LLC, 134 S Ct 843, 851–52 (2014).
6
Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co v Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co,
324 US 806, 816 (1945). For an earlier statement to similar effect, see Pope Manufacturing,
144 US at 234 (“It is as important to the public that competition should not be repressed
by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.”).
3

1946

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1943

other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept
within their legitimate scope.”7
In other words, patent litigation is special because it has the
potential to scuttle monopolies and open markets, benefitting not
just the prevailing party in a given suit, but consumers and competitors throughout the economy. This view is deeply intuitive
and has been the basis for a number of judicial and legislative
enactments to increase the number of patent challenges brought
to fruition. By 1971, the Court had consciously recognized a line
of decisions aimed at “encourag[ing] authoritative testing of patent
validity,”8 and, in more recent years, has continued to root decisions in the “strong public interest” found in the adjudication of
patent rights.9 Following this doctrine, a number of courts have
refused to enforce—and declared federally preempted—otherwisevalid contracts that might impair a party’s incentives or ability to
bring a patent challenge.10 And, in the 2013 case Federal Trade
Commission v Actavis, Inc,11 the Supreme Court declared that settlement itself can sometimes run afoul of the antitrust laws, again
citing the potential for patent litigation to benefit the public
through increased competition.12
Congress, too, has taken steps to encourage parties to contest
the validity and scope of patent rights. For example, a central feature of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
7

Precision Instrument Manufacturing, 324 US at 816.
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc v University of Illinois Foundation, 402 US 313,
344 (1971).
9
See, for example, Cardinal Chemical, 508 US at 100; Medtronic, 134 S Ct at 851–52.
10 See, for example, Lear, Inc v Adkins, 395 US 653, 674–75 (1969); Warner–Jenkinson
Co v Allied Chemical Corp, 567 F2d 184, 188 (2d Cir 1977); Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc
v Moraine Products, 509 F2d 1, 6 (6th Cir 1974); Panther Pumps & Equipment Co v Hydrocraft,
Inc, 468 F2d 225, 230–32 (7th Cir 1972); Massillon–Cleveland–Akron Sign Co v Golden
State Advertising Co, 444 F2d 425, 427 (9th Cir 1971). See also Edward Katzinger Co v
Chicago Metallic Manufacturing Co, 329 US 394, 401–02 (1947) (holding that a party is
not estopped from challenging a patent’s validity despite a contractual covenant to refrain
from doing so); Beckman Instruments, Inc v Technical Development Corp, 433 F2d 55, 62
(7th Cir 1970), abrogated by Act of Aug 27, 1982 § 17, Pub L No 97-247, 96 Stat 317, 322
(refusing to enforce an arbitration provision for a patent validity claim).
11 133 S Ct 2223 (2013).
12 Id at 2234–36. Similar judicial reasoning has shaped the law in other ways as well.
See, for example, Cardinal Chemical, 508 US at 99–101 (requiring the Federal Circuit to
reach questions of validity even when a case could be disposed of on other grounds); Sinclair
& Carroll Co v Interchemical Corp, 325 US 327, 330 (1945) (giving similar guidance to
district courts); Bulldog Electric Products Co v Westinghouse Electric Corp, 162 F2d 994,
997 (2d Cir 1947) (reaching the validity question despite the plaintiff’s unclean hands);
Crane Co v Aeroquip Corp, 356 F Supp 733, 739 (ND Ill 1973); Business Forms Finishing
Service, Inc v Carson, 452 F2d 70, 74 (7th Cir 1971); Broadview Chemical Corp v Loctite
Corp, 474 F2d 1391, 1395 (2d Cir 1973).
8

2016]

Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?

1947

Act of 198413 (the Hatch-Waxman Act) was a regulatory bounty
system designed to incentivize generics to challenge more pharmaceutical patents.14 More recently, the 2011 Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act15 (AIA) created new administrative procedures designed
to encourage the testing of patent validity by enabling earlier, faster,
and cheaper patent challenges.16 And Congress continues to consider
other substantive and procedural mechanisms designed with the
specific goal of stimulating more patent litigation.17
Prior scholarly work in the area has largely taken these benefits as given, and has instead focused on the question whether
private actors will have the incentives to bring patent challenges
in sufficient numbers.18 Overwhelmingly, commentators have
13

Pub L No 98-417, 98 Stat 1585.
See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 Berkeley Tech L J 667, 724–25 (2004) (explaining the operation of
this provision); Generic Drug Entry prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study *4–5 (FTC,
July 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/RBP7-RZD4 (“FTC Generic Drug Study”).
15 Pub L No 112-29, 125 Stat 284 (2011), codified at 35 USC § 100 et seq.
16 See Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 BC L Rev 881, 909–20 (2015) (describing these new procedures); HR Rep No 112-98, 112th Cong, 1st Sess 78 (2011) (“America
Invents Act Report”); Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents
Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed Cir Bar J 539, 599–604 (2012) (summarizing the legislative history); Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v Lee, No 15-446, slip op at 16–17 (US June 20,
2016) (discussing the purposes of the AIA amendments).
17 See, for example, Innovation Act, HR 3309, 113th Cong, 1st Sess 6 (Dec 9, 2013)
(including an attorney’s fee–shifting provision); HR Rep No 113-279, 113th Cong, 1st Sess
21 (2013) (“Innovation Act Report”) (explaining that attorney’s fee–shifting would encourage patent challenges). See also generally Demand Letters and Consumer Protection: Examining Deceptive Practices by Patent Assertion Entities, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance of the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 113th Cong, 1st Sess (2013) (evaluating mechanisms to encourage more patent challenges).
18 See, for example, John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent
System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U Ill L Rev 305, 333; Roger D. Blair and
Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of Patent Disputes Illegal Per Se?, 47 Antitrust Bull
491, 526 (2002); Maureen A. O’Rourke and Joseph F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to
Patent Settlements: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 Minn L Rev 1767,
1777–78 (2003); Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 674 & n 24 (cited in note 14); Joseph
Farrell and Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation
Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 Berkeley Tech L J 943, 946 (2004); Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic
Patents, 19 J Econ Persp 75, 88–89 (Spring 2005); Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable
Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement Deterrent, 74 Mo L Rev 909, 941–43 (2009);
Michael Risch, Patent Challenges and Royalty Inflation, 85 Ind L J 1003, 1022 (2010);
Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 Geo Mason L Rev 41, 65–66 (2012);
Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 Colum L Rev
1483, 1518 (2013); Anup Malani and Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent
Cases, 101 Georgetown L J 637, 656–57 (2013); Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity versus
Noninfringement, 99 Cornell L Rev 71, 113 (2013); Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 Geo Wash L Rev 498, 500, 543 (2015); Alan D. Miller and
14
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concluded that the answer is “no,” and have in turn proposed a
variety of interventions to encourage additional patent challenges—such as bounties,19 expanded standing rules,20 fee-shifting,21
and other reforms.22 Like Congress and the courts, scholars have
focused almost exclusively on the question of how to incentivize
more patent challenges, without exploring the conditions necessary for these challenges to bestow their supposed benefits on the
public.
This Article tests the long-held premise that patent challenges lead to increased competition. A careful examination of the
theory reveals multiple unstated assumptions that have not been
previously identified or scrutinized. To increase competition, a
challenge must be directed at a patent that is a but-for cause of
market power. The challenge must be timely. And it must be successful. When any of these conditions fails, the commonly presumed conclusion that challenges increase competition no longer
holds. And, problematically, there are a number of ways these
conditions can and regularly do fail. This Article draws on a combination of legal doctrine, recent empirical work, and several case
studies to illustrate the difficulties with assuming that the possibility of increasing competition is consistently available in every
patent challenge. As it turns out, there are entire categories of
cases in which the possibility of increasing competition is small,
and even some cases in which it cannot happen at all.
At the same time, this analysis also reveals categories of
cases in which the conditions necessary for a challenge to increase
competition are usually present. The most conspicuous example
is challenges to pharmaceutical patents under the Hatch-Waxman
Act.23 Various features of prescription drug markets and the attendant regulatory regime ensure that the conditions necessary
for a challenge to increase competition will often be present in
Michal S. Gal, Licensee Patent Challenges, 32 Yale J Reg 121, 135–37, 143–45 (2015); Timothy
R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91
Notre Dame L Rev 1007, 1033–39 (2016) (suggesting that recent developments in the law
of indirect liability do not adequately encourage patent challenges).
19 See Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 705 (cited in note 14); Malani and Masur, 101
Georgetown L J at 672 (cited in note 18).
20 Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 544–46 (cited in note 18); Robert C. Dorr, Note,
Patent Law—Patent Validity: The Public Is the Third Party, 51 Denver L J 95, 98 (1974).
21 Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 Berkeley
Tech L J 763, 795–97 (2002).
22 Ford, 99 Cornell L Rev at 118–26 (cited in note 18); Farrell and Merges, 19 Berkeley
Tech L J at 967 (cited in note 18).
23 Several other examples are discussed throughout this Article.
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these cases. This may partially explain why these conditions have
been so frequently assumed: much of the recent case law and
scholarship addressing the competitive effects of patent challenges was crafted with Hatch-Waxman litigation squarely in the
foreground.24 But, in a number of ways that matter for competition, these cases are not typical of patent litigation in general.
Many assumptions that are reasonable in the Hatch-Waxman
context are doubtful in other contexts, though courts and commentators are not always mindful of this distinction.25
To be clear, this Article does not conclude that Hatch-Waxman
challenges always increase competition or that other challenges
never do. Determining whether a challenge is likely to increase
competition requires a detailed, case-specific inquiry, and there is
no simple, bright-line rule that can substitute for this analysis.
This Article also does not develop a position as to whether there
is too much or too little patent litigation in general—there are,
after all, other benefits that could potentially come from patent
litigation.26 But it does argue that the existence of identifiable circumstances in which patent challenges are unlikely to have a significant effect on competition presents both complication and opportunity. If increasing competition by scrutinizing patent rights
is indeed a desirable goal—and there is no reason to think it
isn’t—that goal may be better served by focusing resources on
those challenges in which the conditions necessary to increase
competition are in fact present.
To these ends, this Article presents a number of policy implications spanning the judicial, administrative, and legislative domains. For example, this analysis yields important guidance for
how the Patent Office should implement its new authority to review issued patents under the AIA.27 It also exposes flaws in judicially created policies intended to encourage more patent challenges.28 It sheds new light on the competitive consequences of
patent settlements and thus informs how the 2013 Supreme
24 Within the last decade, the antitrust treatment of reverse-payment settlements in
Hatch-Waxman litigation generated a circuit split, hundreds of law review articles (easily
found through a search for “reverse /s settlement /s payment & Hatch-Waxman” in
Westlaw’s JLR database), and, ultimately, a Supreme Court opinion. See Parts III.C–D.
Still, this is at best a partial explanation, since the presumption that patent challenges
increase competition predates the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act by decades. See notes 5–6 and
accompanying text.
25 See Part III.D (discussing Actavis and commentary).
26 See Part I.C.
27 See Part III.A.
28 See Part III.B.
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Court decision Actavis should be applied in future cases.29 And it
provides a framework for evaluating the various reforms scholars
have proposed to incentivize patent litigation.30
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces several
plausible reasons why patent litigation might be more valuable
than other forms of litigation and contextualizes the particular
theory that is the focus of this Article—that patent challenges increase competition. Part II explores this theory in more detail,
identifying and evaluating several previously unstated assumptions implicit in that theory. Part III presents a number of implications of the prior analysis. The final Part concludes.
I. BACKGROUND: WHAT MAKES PATENT LITIGATION SPECIAL?
As the Introduction described, there is a long-standing and
widespread consensus among courts and commentators that patent
litigation is somehow different from other forms of civil disputes.
This Part more closely examines the question why. In so doing, it
introduces several theories of how patent litigation might benefit
the public, focusing on explanations that are specific to patent litigation among all other forms of litigation. It then defines a few
terms and concepts that will be used throughout the balance of
the Article.
A. Patent Litigation Clarifies the Law and Yields Other
Valuable Information
One potential benefit of patent challenges is the production
of information that is relevant to others beyond any given dispute.
As Professor Owen Fiss famously argued in his 1984 article
Against Settlement, settlement deprives courts of the opportunity
to do justice and interpret the law, mooting an otherwise valuable
“interpretive occasion[ ].”31 One could expand this argument
slightly to include other kinds of information as well—pleadings
and trials might bring important facts into the public eye, and
final judgments might send powerful messages about the primacy
of the rule of law. Litigation can also lead to jury trials, which, as

29

See Part III.D.
See Part III.C.
31 Fiss, 93 Yale L J at 1085 (cited in note 3). See also Lederman, 75 Notre Dame L
Rev at 228 (cited in note 3).
30
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the Supreme Court has noted, afford the public an important opportunity for direct participation in the adjudicatory process.32
These arguments are not necessarily wrong, but they prove
too much. The problem is that the same benefits could be claimed
for civil litigation generally—any case might yield legal rules, valuable information, or the opportunity for jury service—and yet
judicial policy in this country is explicitly oriented in favor of settlement. If the question is why patent litigation is special, why
the presence of a patent claim causes a case to take on particular
importance, Fiss-style assertions about the benefits of litigation
generally cannot be the answer. Instead, what is needed is a public benefit that is specific to patent cases, one that is not found in
run-of-the-mill contract or property disputes. This requirement
excludes many benefits that might flow from patent litigation just
as well as from any other form of litigation.
B. Individual Patent Challenges Increase Competition
One theory that is specific to patent disputes is that they present an opportunity to mitigate the harms to competition imposed
by individual patents. On most accounts, the purpose of having a
patent system is to reward invention through time-limited bequests of market power.33 According to this theory of the benefits
of patent challenges, such cases can reduce or eliminate the patent
holder’s market power, stemming the harms to competition that
might otherwise flow from an overbroad or invalid grant.
When explaining why patent challenges are specially vested
with a public interest, courts and commentators have repeatedly
invoked exactly this theory. In this view, all patents—valid or not—
impose the static and dynamic costs attendant to other monopolies,
such as reduced output, higher prices, and inhibited innovation.34
32

See Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 406–08 (1991).
See Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and
Market Power, 49 Ariz L Rev 837, 855–56 (2007). There are other theories of how the patent
system might benefit the public, some of which are less dependent on a regulatory bequest
of market power for their success than the prevailing rewards theory. See Stephen Yelderman,
Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 BU L Rev 1565, 1577–81 (2016). The following
discussion is framed in terms of the traditional rewards account because the theory of how
patent challenges can benefit competition is typically set against that backdrop. In any
event, the ex post costs of patents can be significant regardless of the theory invoked to
justify them. See id at 1594 (noting that significant market power is possible even with a
coordination-focused patent system).
34 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc v University of Illinois Foundation, 402 US
313, 343 (1971) (asserting that a patent “has the economic consequences attending other
monopolies”).
33
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These are the ex post costs incurred to create the ex ante incentives offered by the patent system. Whether these costs are justified depends on whether the underlying patent was properly
granted. When a patent is valid, the ex post costs it imposes are
simply the price of rewarding invention through a system of exclusive rights.35 But when the patent is actually invalid, these
same costs are no longer justified.36 Although patent litigation is
expensive in its own right,37 the upsides of eliminating unjustified
market power can more than justify the process costs of doing so.38
In short, patent challenges are a golden opportunity to mitigate
the costs of having a patent system.
Increased competition is a clear public benefit, and one that
can make patent litigation different from run-of-the-mill contracts or torts cases, the outcomes of which do not typically affect
the competitiveness of markets.39 As the Supreme Court has explained, “a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market.”40
Because patent grants are a departure from normal promarket
principles, “[i]t is as important to the public that competition
should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee
of a really valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.”41 Patent challenges thus advance the “public interest in free
competition” by offering a chance of terminating a “patent monopoly.”42 As a result, there is an inherent public interest in patent
35 The theory, at least, is that these costs will be justified by increased innovation in
the long term. See Graham v John Deere Co of Kansas City, 383 US 1, 9 (1966).
36 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2232.
37 See 2015 Report of the Economic Survey I-110 to -112 (American Intellectual Property Law Association 2015) (“AIPLA 2015 Report”) (reporting that each side’s attorney’s
fees for a patent trial often run into the millions of dollars).
38 Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 639, 657 (cited in note 18); Farrell and
Merges, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 946 (cited in note 18); Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at
538–39 (cited in note 18); Dorr, Note, 51 Denver L J at 113 (cited in note 20); To Promote
Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy ch 1, *11 (FTC,
Oct 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/D4DC-WGC7 (“FTC Innovation Report”) (“If an unwarranted patent confers market power on a patentholder, it can deprive consumers of the
benefits of competition without compensating value.”).
39 See Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 679 (cited in note 14) (claiming that patents,
unlike contracts or torts, affect public—and not just private—interests).
40 Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co v Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co,
324 US 806, 816 (1945).
41 Pope Manufacturing Co v Gormully, 144 US 224, 234 (1892).
42 United States v Glaxo Group Ltd, 410 US 52, 57–59, 69 (1973) (restating and summarizing the history of this argument). See also Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v Lee,
No 15-446, slip op at 16–17 (US June 20, 2016); Medtronic, Inc v Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S Ct 843, 851–52 (2014); Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234; Cardinal Chemical Co
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challenges, and that interest is not necessarily represented by
any of the parties to a particular patent dispute.43
A notable feature of this theory is that it predicts measurable
benefits in a well-defined sphere. Previously, a patent right was
reducing competition in some product market, resulting in reduced output, higher prices for consumers, and impaired incentives to innovate in the future. Then a challenge changes things.
Competition in the relevant markets increases. Output expands.
Prices fall. Innovation occurs. In short, this theory implies that a
successful patent challenge will be a discrete, dramatic event that
opens a definable product market to competition. The promised
benefits include immediate, observable price effects as well as
more subtle, longer-term benefits for future innovation.44
This is the theory that is the primary focus of this Article. As
a justification, it is a fruitful topic for inquiry—it is patent-specific,
is testable in individual cases, and has been widely invoked by
courts and commentators alike. Moreover, the specificity of this
theory makes it possible to assess the public desirability of patent
challenges at an individual level. Consider, for example, a patent
challenge that costs $5 million to litigate to judgment, but results
in a multiyear 10 percent price reduction and a 5 percent increase
in quantity in a $10 billion annual market. With these numbers,
the deadweight losses avoided by removing patent market power
are many times the process costs of the litigation, so a challenge
like that one is plainly worthwhile.45 Conversely, when it does not
v Morton International, Inc, 508 US 83, 100–01 (1993); Blonder-Tongue, 402 US at 342–
48; Lear, Inc v Adkins, 395 US 653, 663–64 (1969); In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P3d 845,
850 (Cal 2015); FTC Innovation Report at ch 1, *11 (cited in note 38). A number of commentators have similarly suggested that patent challenges benefit the public by increasing
competition. See, for example, Dorr, Note, 51 Denver L J at 97, 113 (cited in note 20);
Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 689–90 (cited in note 14); Malani and Masur, 101
Georgetown L J at 657 (cited in note 18); Farrell and Merges, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 946
(cited in note 18); Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 538–39 (cited in note 18).
43 Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 679–80, 738 (cited in note 14); Malani and Masur,
101 Georgetown L J at 668–69 (cited in note 18); Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J Econ Persp at
75, 91 (cited in note 18); Dorr, Note, 51 Denver L J at 103, 113 (cited in note 20).
44 In addition to static costs saved, a successful challenge can avoid certain dynamic
harms—such as reduced future investment in the area covered by the patent and overinvestment in alternate technologies. These dynamic benefits will often be more difficult to
measure, but the theory that patent challenges increase competition nonetheless predicts
that such benefits will occur at a specific time and place—in the wake of the challenge
itself and in the field in which the successful challenge occurred.
45 In the simplest model (with a linear demand curve, constant marginal costs, and
a resulting competitive equilibrium), deadweight loss is given by one-half of the product
of the change in quantity and the change in output. See Walter Nicholson and Christopher
Snyder, Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions 425–26 (Thomson 10th ed
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work out that way—when a challenge does not result in an improvement in price, quantity, innovation,46 or some other metric
of competition—this theory does not justify the cost of litigation
incurred. That does not mean the disputants should be prohibited
from going to trial, but, unless some other benefit is shown, the
litigation may have been a waste of resources. On this theory’s
own terms, if a case does not appear likely to have an effect on
competition, settlement may be preferable to adjudication for all
the reasons that apply to civil litigation in general.
This Article carefully scrutinizes the conditions necessary for
patent challenges to increase competition and the factors that determine the magnitude of any benefit that is obtained. However,
it should be noted that increased competition is not the only public benefit that plausibly might come from patent litigation. The
next Section introduces other potential benefits and explains how
they relate to the theory that is the focus of this Article.
C. The Distributional Effects of Patent Challenges in the
Aggregate
As the prior Section described, the dominant theory of how
patent challenges benefit the public is that they avoid the costs of
patent-based market power in individual cases. But there are
other potential effects as well. Given that patent litigation often
has significant distributional consequences, it seems likely that
2008). In this example, the prechallenge price (P) times the prechallenge quantity (Q) is
$10 billion. The difference between the old price and the new price is (0.1)*P, and the
difference between the new quantity and the old quantity is (0.05)*Q. With a linear demand curve and constant costs, the deadweight loss avoided is therefore
(0.5)*(0.1)*P*(0.05)*Q, which simplifies to (0.0025)*P*Q. Since P*Q is $10 billion, the
deadweight loss avoided is therefore $25 million annually. As a result, the deadweight
losses avoided in the first year alone would exceed the cost of even an unusually expensive
patent litigation. See AIPLA 2015 Report at I-112 (cited in note 37) (reporting that, in 90
percent of patent cases with more than $25 million at stake, the cost of litigating through
trial was less than or equal to $12 million). The precise calculations here are beside the
point, which is only that in some cases the public benefits of increased competition can
trounce the process costs necessary to obtain them. See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate
Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition,
109 Colum L Rev 629, 648–50 (2009) (describing settlements involving pharmaceuticals
with billions of dollars of annual sales).
46 It is important to note that the postulated benefit for innovation here is the avoidance of dynamic harms that might otherwise be caused by the challenged patent. This is
in contrast to the theory (described in the next Section) that improved accuracy may increase the ex ante incentives created by the patent system itself. One is a claim about the
benefits of mitigating the ex post costs of a specific patent, while the other is rooted in the
ex ante effects of improving the patent system as a whole. See note 48 and accompanying
text.
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challenges have aggregate effects that go beyond the cost savings
that can be tabulated on a case-by-case basis. In other words,
there may be a public interest at a systemic level that is not fully
captured by the sum of the static and dynamic costs avoided
through individual challenges.
This theory is right as far as it goes, but it is not easily
brought down to specifics. First, it depends on the claim that the
public has a greater interest in the distributional consequences of
patent cases than those of any other category of civil litigation.
Otherwise, this theory suffers from the same overbreadth problem as the Fiss-style benefits discussed above, and cannot explain
why patent challenges in particular should be encouraged within
a judicial landscape that typically favors settlement. Surely the
public has some interest in the distributional consequences of contract or property cases, and yet the prevailing view is that the
public comes out ahead when those kinds of cases are resolved
without a trial.
One possible answer is that the public has a special interest
in the distributional outcomes of patent cases because they determine the effectiveness of the patent system itself.47 The patent
system is, after all, premised on a theory of ex ante incentives; the
idea is that people will invest more in innovation if they anticipate a greater reward for doing so. The system’s success in creating these incentives therefore depends on its ability to accurately
47 The public interest in the distributional outcomes of patent cases is explored in a
subsequent paper. See generally Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent
System (working paper, 2016) (on file with author). For prior discussion of the public’s
interest in the outcomes of patent cases, see R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality
Mechanisms, 157 U Pa L Rev 2135, 2140–45 (2009); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 577, 592 (1999); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 Minn L Rev 101, 127, 179 (2006); Jay P.
Kesan and Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should
We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 Emory L J 61, 76–77, 90–92
(2006); Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 Minn J L
Sci & Tech 1, 9–11 (2007); Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 650–52, 657 (cited
in note 18); FTC Innovation Report at ch 5, *2 (cited in note 38) (“Payment of royalties on
an invalid patent distorts the incentive system that the patent system was designed to
provide.”); Einer Elhauge and Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 Tex
L Rev 283, 293–95 (2012); Kesan, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 767 (cited in note 21) (describing
rent-seekers who choose to invest based on bad patents); Thomas, 2001 U Ill L Rev at 319–
20 (cited in note 18) (describing how rent-seeking patent filers may divert resources from
productive activities); Ford, 99 Cornell L Rev at 113 (cited in note 18); Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw U L Rev 1495, 1515 (2001); Joseph Farrell
and Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents?, 98 Am Econ Rev 1347, 1349, 1362 (2008)
(concluding that weak patents distort innovation incentives); In re Cipro, 348 P3d at 868.
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award benefits to those who invest in innovation. Persistent mistakes weaken the correlation between awards and deserts,
thereby undermining the incentives to innovate that the patent
system is supposed to provide. As a form of intensive post-grant
scrutiny, patent challenges correct mistakes in individual cases
and, ideally, improve the incentives created by the patent system
for future prospective inventors as a whole.
In contrast to the theory that individual challenges increase
competition, this theory is concerned with the effects of patent
challenges in the aggregate. The public might not care how individual cases are resolved, but nonetheless have an interest in the
allocation of the costs and benefits of patents at a systemic level.
As a result, the theory’s predicted benefits cannot be cabined to
any particular sphere.48 A series of challenges in one field can
stimulate innovation in another. The benefits of improved accuracy may accrue gradually over time. There may be little to no
relationship between individual litigation events and observable
public gains. The prediction here is straightforward but broad:
improved expectations of accuracy will lead to greater innovation
in the long run.
While this is a plausible explanation for why patent cases are
special, stating it proves frustratingly little. The problem is that
the relationship between patent grants and innovation in general
remains a mystery.49 For the same reasons, it is quite difficult to
measure (or even estimate) the public benefit of improving the
accuracy of patent grants. Consider, for example, a hypothetical
policy proposal that will cause an extra $1 billion to be spent litigating patents annually—roughly the direct cost of having 300
patent trials each year instead of the typical 150.50 It seems reasonable to assume that this additional investment in litigation
48

This is in contrast with the possibility that a successful patent challenge can reduce dynamic harms in the field of the formerly patented invention. See note 46.
49 See, for example, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 Va L Rev
65, 75–84 (2015) (surveying the literature and concluding that “none of these studies resolves whether patents have a net positive effect on innovation, much less their net welfare
effect, or whether alternative innovation incentives such as grants, prizes, and tax credits
are inferior”); Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and
the Innovation Process, 29 Rsrch Pol 531, 531 (2000) (“[R]obust conclusions regarding the
empirical consequences for technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few.”).
50 See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, and David L. Schwartz, Understanding the
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 Tex L Rev 1769, 1779 (2014) (observing 290 trials
based on complaints filed during a two-year period). Depending on the amount at stake,
litigating a patent dispute through trial typically costs each side somewhere between $1
million and $7 million. See AIPLA 2015 Report at I-110 to -112 (cited in note 37). Patent
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will lead to a more accurate allocation of the costs and benefits of
the patent system. It might also be reasonable to assume that this
additional investment will lead to some increase in future incentives to invent. But even with these assumptions, it is quite challenging to determine whether this improvement in accuracy will
justify its substantial cost—and thus whether encouraging challenges in this way is indeed good policy. If the public benefits of a
more accurate patent system turn out to be, say, $10 billion, the
increased investment in litigation is easily worth its $1 billion
cost. But if the benefits of a more accurate system turn out to be
more like $10 million, then this increased expenditure on litigation is misguided. Either number is facially plausible, and it is
unclear how one would determine whether an increased investment in accuracy is cost justified.51
There is, however, a way of avoiding this indeterminacy. If
one can show that the costs of a patent challenge are already justified by the challenge’s benefits for competition—that is, by the
theory described in the prior Section—then the exact magnitude
of any benefit from improved accuracy becomes irrelevant. If the
proposed $1 billion in additional patent litigation reliably saves
$1 billion in deadweight losses by eliminating market power, then
it does not matter how much extra benefit the public gets from
having a more accurate patent system. Once incremental patent
challenges are justified by their benefits for competition, the advantages for innovation come as a bonus. In this way, the theory
that patent challenges increase competition can be used as a kind
of shield for purposes of cost-benefit analysis, providing cover for
benefits of unknowable magnitude. (And indeed, most commentators seem to tack accuracy improvements onto other benefits,
rather than arguing that these improvements justify policy interventions standing alone.)52
Caution is in order here. The difficulty of estimating the ex
ante benefits of increased accuracy does not mean those benefits
do not exist. To the contrary, it would be surprising to find that a
dramatic change in the rate of patent challenges had no effect on
litigation imposes costs on third parties as well. See Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1521–22
(cited in note 47).
51 Indeterminacy like this is common in patent policymaking and often pervades
core, unavoidable questions at the heart of the patent system. See Oskar Liivak, Establishing an Island of Patent Sanity, 78 Brooklyn L Rev 1335, 1337–38 (2013).
52 See, for example, Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 689–90 (cited in note 14); Kesan,
17 Berkeley Tech L J at 767–68 (cited in note 21); Merges, 14 Berkeley Tech L J at 595–
96 (cited in note 47).
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innovation, one way or the other. However, the difficulty of quantifying the ex ante effect on innovation only heightens the need to
understand when and how individual patent challenges can increase competition ex post. To the extent the accuracy of the patent
system can be improved through cases that also happen to save
on ex post costs, the decision is an easy one. But once those opportunities are used up, and the remaining options for improving accuracy start increasing ex post costs, one must confront much
more difficult questions about the relationship between the patent
system’s errors and innovation. The practical ability of patent litigation to produce public benefits in excess of costs is thus central
to larger questions about the consequences of errors and the value
of accuracy in the patent system more generally.
This Article’s focus on a particular theory of how patent challenges can benefit the public is not intended to imply that other
theories lack merit. There may very well be other benefits that
justify a general policy of encouraging challenges, or that perhaps
justify more tailored policies of discouraging settlement in certain
cases. Because of the possibility that patent litigation produces
benefits not considered here, this Article’s conclusions are limited. It does not seek to answer whether there is too much or too
little patent litigation in general. Rather, it closely examines a
specific, long-standing, and widely cited theory—and, indeed, one
that predicts significant public benefits when certain conditions
are present.
***
Finally, a few definitional points. As used in this Article, “patent
challenge” includes both adjudications of invalidity and adjudications of noninfringement. This broad definition is not meant to
suggest that both kinds of rulings always have equal value. To
the contrary, and as courts and commentators have recognized, a
determination of invalidity is, in general, more likely to increase
competition than a determination of noninfringement. The simple
reason is that an invalidity judgment removes the patent’s threat
completely, while a noninfringement ruling leaves open the possibility that some other product might infringe the patent.53 Nonetheless, both determinations have the ability to affect competition
53 See, for example, Cover v Schwartz, 133 F2d 541, 545 (2d Cir 1942); Cardinal
Chemical, 508 US at 100–01; Ford, 99 Cornell L Rev at 118–26 (cited in note 18) (proposing
reforms to encourage more litigation of validity defenses rather than noninfringement defenses); Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 Harv
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in some cases, so this Article considers both as potentially valuable
forms of challenge, noting situations in which the distinction is
likely to make a difference. Moreover, the term “challenge” is just
shorthand for the presentation of these arguments to a court; it
does not depend on who sued whom and does not imply any judgment about which party was the aggressor.54
Traditionally, the most significant forum for patent challenges has been the federal district court, entertaining either a
claim of infringement by a patent holder or a declaratory judgment action by a potential patent defendant. But in recent years,
administrative agencies have played an increasingly important
role, first as the International Trade Commission (ITC) became a
popular forum for patent litigation in the 2000s,55 and then as the
Patent Office launched the post-grant review and inter partes review procedures created by the AIA.56 For purposes of the following discussion, the term “patent challenges” includes both litigation in Article III courts and proceedings in the ITC, but does not
include administrative review procedures in the Patent Office.
Those proceedings receive their own analysis in Part III.A.
II. THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR A PATENT CHALLENGE TO
INCREASE COMPETITION
As discussed in the prior Part, courts and commentators have
routinely asserted that patent challenges benefit the public by increasing competition through the elimination of unjustified patent
monopolies. The basic story of how patent challenges provide this
benefit goes something like this: A firm with a patent sells a product into what would otherwise be a competitive market. The patent
enables the firm to exclude would-be competitors from a relevant
product market and therefore charge a monopoly price for its
product. One of these would-be competitors challenges the patent
and obtains a judgment that allows it and others to enter the market and sell their products. In the face of such competition, the

J L & Tech 77, 108–11, 121–24 (2014) (evaluating these differences and proposing reforms
to encourage applicants to file claims with greater uncertainty as to infringement than as
to validity).
54 See Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 648 & n 46 (cited in note 18).
55 Colleen V. Chien and Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public
Interest, 98 Cornell L Rev 1, 14–17 (2012).
56 See Part III.A.
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monopoly price falls to a competitive price, benefitting consumers,
upstream suppliers, and the economy as a whole.57
When things turn out as just described, the public benefits
can be substantial. For example, one recent study estimated that,
between 1997 and 2008, patent challenges resulted in $92 billion
of additional consumer surplus in the market for hypertension
treatments alone.58 A number of empirical studies (all examining
markets for pharmaceuticals) have found consistent results: patent
challenges lead to more entry, increased competition, and lower
prices for consumers.59 These benefits are measured in terms of
hundreds of millions or billions of dollars—easily dominating the
cost of the patent litigations that made them possible. And even
in markets that have not been as amenable to empirical study, it
seems reasonable to expect that the elimination of patent-based
market power should lead to the same kinds of public benefits—
lower prices, increased innovation, expanded consumer choice,
and so on—that the elimination of unjustified power has generally.60
The difficulty is that the path from a given patent challenge
to a meaningful effect on competition is not always so direct. Upon
examination, the theory for how this is supposed to happen depends on four specific conditions that have not previously been
given much attention. First, the patent subject to the challenge
gives its owner a monopoly (or at least market power) in a relevant market. Second, the challenged patent is a but-for cause of
the firm’s market power; the firm does not possess other intellectual property or advantages that redundantly preserve its competitive position. Third, all of this happens prospectively: the patented technology and the patent itself remain relevant for some
57 As noted above, this outcome may yield long-term benefits for innovation in the
previously monopolized product market as well. See notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
58 See Lee G. Branstetter, Chirantan Chatterjee, and Matthew Higgins, Regulation
and Welfare: Evidence from Paragraph IV Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry
*1 (NBER Working Paper No 17188, June 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/5BZ6-GJ2L.
59 See, for example, FTC Generic Drug Study at *22–23 (cited in note 14); Henry
Grabowski and John Vernon, Longer Patents for Increased Generic Competition in the US:
The Waxman-Hatch Act after One Decade, 10 PharmacoEconomics Supp 2 110, 121 (1996);
Laura E. Panattoni, The Effect of Paragraph IV Decisions and Generic Entry before Patent
Expiration on Brand Pharmaceutical Firms, 30 J Health Econ 126, 132–33, 136 (2011). A
recent study not limited to the pharmaceutical context found evidence of increased innovation in the wake of successful challenges, but did not examine price effects. See Alberto
Galasso and Mark Schankerman, Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence
from the Courts, 130 Q J Econ 317, 339–41 (2015).
60 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc v University of Illinois Foundation, 402 US
313, 342–43 (1971) (asserting that a patent can create all the costs of a typical monopoly,
and that the monopoly should be carefully limited); Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234.
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meaningful period of time after the legal rulings have taken effect. In other words, the patent challenge does not merely allocate
past value, but affects competition going forward. Fourth, the patent
challenge turns out to be successful, such that this potential prospective removal of a but-for cause of market power is actually
realized.
Court opinions and prior scholarship have assumed (often implicitly) that all of these conditions hold and have not explored
the consequences when they do not.61 Each of the following sections considers one of these conditions in more detail and evaluates the reasonability of assuming that it holds for patent challenges generally.
A. The Challenged Patent Confers Market Power
For a patent challenge to be capable of increasing competition, the disputed patent must be a cause of diminished competition in the first place. This is simple enough to state, but it is a
point that has been overlooked with surprising frequency. In fact,
courts and commentators often begin their analysis of patent
challenges with the proposition that the patent at issue confers a
monopoly, or at least market power.62

61 For discussion of the effects of patent challenges on competition, see Cardinal
Chemical Co v Morton International, Inc, 508 US 83, 100–01 (1993); Blonder-Tongue, 402
US at 342–43; Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234; Lear, Inc v Adkins, 395 US 653, 663–64 (1969);
In re Cipro Cases I & II, 348 P3d 845, 850 (Cal 2015); Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown
L J at 652, 657, 671 (cited in note 18); Dorr, Note, 51 Denver L J at 113 (cited in note 20);
Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 538–39 (cited in note 18); Ford, 99 Cornell L Rev at 78–
80 (cited in note 18); Blair and Cotter, 47 Antitrust Bull at 526 (cited in note 18); O’Rourke
and Brodley, 87 Minn L Rev at 1777–78 (cited in note 18); Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at
686–87 (cited in note 14); Farrell and Merges, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 946 (cited in note
18); Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J Econ Persp at 88–89 (cited in note 18); Miller and Gal, 32
Yale J Reg at 135–37, 143–45 (cited in note 18); Shubha Ghosh and Jay Kesan, What Do
Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 Houston L Rev
1219, 1229–31 (2004); Elhauge and Krueger, 91 Tex L Rev at 290–91 (cited in note 47)
(considering the effect of litigation delays on the remaining patent term).
62 See, for example, Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236; Cardinal Chemical, 508 US at 100–01
(“[T]he opportunity to relitigate might, as a practical matter, grant monopoly privileges to
the holders of invalid patents.”); Blonder-Tongue, 402 US at 342–43; Lear, 395 US at 663–
64; In re Cipro, 348 P3d at 850; Bilski v Kappos, 561 US 593, 656 (2010) (Stevens concurring in the judgment) (“Of course, patents always serve as a barrier to competition for the
type of subject matter that is patented.”); Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 652,
657, 671 (cited in note 18); Dorr, Note, 51 Denver L J at 113 (cited in note 20); Miller, 19
Berkeley Tech L J at 688–90 (cited in note 14); Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J Econ Persp at
90–92 (cited in note 18); T. Randolph Beard, et al, Quantifying the Cost of Substandard
Patents: Some Preliminary Evidence, 12 Yale J L & Tech 240, 244–45 (2010).
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Clearly, some patents do confer market power, at least some
of the time. If patents never conferred market power, there would
be no point to having a patent system.63 Moreover, there are a
number of examples of patents that have allowed their owners to
raise prices,64 so the possibility of patent market power is certainly a real one.
But just as it is recognized that some patents confer market
power, it is widely understood today that many patents do not. As
a result, market power cannot be assumed from the mere fact of
a patent grant. Moreover, it is not safe to infer (as many do) that
a challenged patent confers market power simply because two
parties find it profitable to fight over it. The following sections
consider each argument for patent market power in turn.
1. Market power cannot be assumed in patent rights
generally.
In the standard framing of the costs and benefits of a patent
challenge, the patent at issue creates a product monopoly.65 This
circumstance is an exceedingly familiar one to theorists, as it is
often found in the most basic economic models of how the patent
system rewards invention. Professors F.M. Scherer and David
Ross’s textbook treatment of the competitive effects of patents is
typical: “If the [patented] product is really new and useful, it creates a wholly new demand curve . . . that did not exist previously.
With an exclusive right to make and sell its product, the patent
holder is a monopolist.”66
This approach is appealing—and theoretically useful—because
it allows the costs of the patent monopoly to be crisply compared

63

See Katz, 49 Ariz L Rev at 841–42 (cited in note 33).
The best examples come from the pharmaceutical industry, in which generics typically offer the same drug at a discount of 20 percent or more after the original developer’s
patent has expired. See David Reiffen and Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 Rev Econ & Stat 37, 43–44 (2005); Richard G. Frank and David S. Salkever,
Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals, 6 J Econ & Mgmt Strategy 75, 89 (1997).
65 See, for example, Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236; Cardinal Chemical, 508 US at 100–
01; Blonder-Tongue, 402 US at 342–43; Lear, 395 US at 663–64; In re Cipro, 348 P3d at 850.
66 F.M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 622 (Houghton Mifflin 3d ed 1990). See also Steven Shavell and Tanguy van
Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J L & Econ 525, 529 (2001) (“Under the patent system, the innovator’s incentive to invest in research is the monopoly profits he would earn.”); Suzanne Scotchmer, Innovation and Incentives 36 (MIT 2004) (“Intellectual property rights make the proprietor a monopolist.”); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary
and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 Vand L Rev
1727, 1733 (2000) (observing the typicality of this approach).
64
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to a presumed baseline in which, as Scherer and Ross put it,
“there [are] no patent protection and no other barriers to the imitation of the innovator’s invention.”67 In other words, if the patent
is in force, the owner has a monopoly; if not, perfect competition
ensues. From this “monopoly-on/monopoly-off” modeling, the
path to the conclusion that patent challenges serve the public interest is not difficult to follow. If a challenge succeeds, consumers
get the perfectly competitive scenario instead of the monopoly scenario—a clear public benefit.
But there is a complication here lurking in plain sight: many
patents do not confer much market power at all. Patent monopolies in the economic sense of the term—those that have the competitive effects predicted by textbook models like Scherer and
Ross’s—are the exception, not the rule. As Professor Kenneth
Dam succinctly observed some years ago, “[L]eading companies
may obtain 1,000 or more patents in a single year, and yet many
such firms are unlikely ever to obtain even a single monopoly in
any market.”68 Another way of reaching the same conclusion is by
examining the rate at which patent holders pay the fees required
to renew their patent rights and the rate at which they allow
those rights to lapse. If every patent conferred more than a slight
degree of power in a product market of any consequence, then
every patent would easily be worth paying renewal fees costing
less than $1,000 for each year of patent term.69 And yet every day
hundreds of patents are allowed to lapse for failure to pay such
fees.70 Indeed, by their fourth year, about 16 percent of patents
have lapsed, and, by their twelfth year, more than 53 percent of
patents have lapsed.71 These data flatly rebut the proposition that
patents always or even typically confer market power.72
67 Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market Structure at 622 (cited in note 66). A few
pages later, Scherer and Ross warn that the real world is more complicated. Id at 624.
68 Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J Legal Stud
247, 250 (1994) (citation omitted).
69 If a patent owner fails to pay the maintenance fees due at certain required intervals, the patent lapses and becomes part of the public domain. See 35 USC § 41(b)(2).
Today, the total maintenance fees for the typical patent over the course of an approximately seventeen-year patent term are $12,600. See 37 CFR § 1.20(e)–(g). Previously, the
fees were significantly lower. See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 Berkeley Tech
L J 1521, 1525 (2005) (describing maintenance fees at the time of the study, totaling $7,000
over the term of the patent).
70 See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Expired Patents, 64 Cath U L Rev 419, 435 (2015).
71 See Moore, 20 Berkeley Tech L J at 1526, 1531 (cited in note 69).
72 Some of these nonrenewed patents may have conferred market power at some
point, but lost their significance due to technical obsolescence. See notes 140–47 and accompanying text. So, more precisely, nonrenewal suggests that the patent lacked market
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This observation—that the majority of issued patents do not
appear to create monopoly or even market power—is not new. In
fact, there is widespread consensus among courts, commentators,
and the antitrust agencies that patents should not be presumed
to convey market power.73 This was not always the case—for the
better part of the last century, courts presumed that the producer
of a product covered by one of its own patents enjoyed market
power, both for purposes of the patent misuse doctrine74 and for
purposes of antitrust analysis.75 But Congress abrogated the former presumption in 1988,76 and in 2006 the Supreme Court
scotched the latter presumption as well in the landmark case Illinois
Tool Works Inc v Independent Ink, Inc.77 Citing the “vast majority
of academic literature on the subject,”78 the “virtual consensus
among economists,”79 and the position of the antitrust agencies,
the Court overruled its earlier precedent and declined to impose
even a rebuttable presumption that patents confer market power
for purposes of antitrust analysis.80

power by the time the maintenance fee came due. In the other direction, it would be wrong
to assume that every renewed patent does confer market power, for patents can offer other
sources of private value as well. See generally Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U Chi L
Rev 625 (2002) (describing how patents can be used to convey valuable information about
a firm).
73 See Illinois Tool Works Inc v Independent Ink, Inc, 547 US 28, 38–42 (2006); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law § 8.3 at 219 (West 1985); Dam, 23 J
Legal Stud at 250 (cited in note 68); Russell Lombardy, Comment, The Myth of Market
Power: Why Market Power Should Not Be Presumed When Applying Antitrust Principles
to the Analysis of Tying Agreements Involving Intellectual Property, 8 St Thomas L Rev
449, 468–69 (1996); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of
Intellectual Property Law 374 (Belknap 2003); Herbert Hovenkamp, et al, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 4.2 at 4-8
to -9 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed 2015 & Supp 2016); Nancy T. Gallini and Michael J. Trebilcock,
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy: A Framework for the Analysis of Economic and Legal Issues, in Robert D. Anderson and Nancy T. Gallini, eds, Competition Policy
and Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy 17, 22 (Calgary 1998); Kitch,
53 Vand L Rev at 1730 (cited in note 66); Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property § 2.2 at *4 (DOJ and FTC, Apr 6, 1995), archived at http://perma.cc/2MRN-RUSL.
74 See, for example, Morton Salt Co v G.S. Suppiger Co, 314 US 488, 490–91 (1942);
United States v Loew’s Inc, 371 US 38, 45–46 (1962). For a discussion of these doctrinal
developments, see Illinois Tool Works, 547 US at 38–40; Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling
the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U Pa L Rev 761, 775 n 35 (2002) (collecting cases).
75 See, for example, International Salt Co v United States, 332 US 392, 395 (1947).
76 Act of Nov 19, 1988 § 201, Pub L No 100-703, 102 Stat 4674, 4676, codified at 35
USC § 271(d)(5).
77 547 US 28, 31 (2006).
78 Id at 43 n 4.
79 Id at 45.
80 See id at 44–46.
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So the fact that patents do not typically confer product monopolies (or even market power) has been accepted for at least a
decade.81 But when it comes to assessing the benefits of patent
challenges, the “monopoly” framing appears quite resilient. For
example, court decisions written in the last few years can still be
found describing the value of patent challenges in terms of a presumed patent monopoly.82 Even the Supreme Court, notwithstanding its holding in Illinois Tool Works, continues to express
concern that the public should not “continually be required to pay
tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.”83
In light of the Court’s own recognition of the dubiousness of assuming market power, the persistence of this language is really
quite puzzling.84
But even if patents in general do not usually confer market
power, perhaps it is reasonable to presume market power in cases
in which challenges actually arise. After all, the fact that two parties find a patent worth litigation might suggest that that particular patent is one of the minority conferring market power. The
reasonability of this inference is the subject of the next Section.

81

But see Katz, 49 Ariz L Rev at 893–97 (cited in note 33) (criticizing Illinois Tool

Works).
82 See, for example, In re Cipro, 348 P3d at 850; Applied Medical Resources Corp v
United States Surgical Corp, 352 F Supp 2d 1119, 1126 (CD Cal 2005).
83 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2233, quoting Lear, 395 US at 670. See also Cuozzo Speed
Technologies, LLC v Lee, No 15-446, slip op at 16 (US June 20, 2016), quoting Precision
Instrument Manufacturing Co v Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co, 324 US 806, 816
(1945) (“[I]n addition to helping resolve concrete patent-related disputes among parties,
inter partes review helps protect the public’s ‘paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.’”) (ellipsis in original).
84 One potential explanation is that when courts and commentators refer to a “patent
monopoly,” they do not really mean it—that is, they are using a shorthand for “exclusive
rights,” without intending to refer to monopolies in an economic sense. See Edmund W.
Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 Rsrch L & Econ 31, 33 (1986) (observing
the ambiguous use of the term “monopoly”). But this explanation presents problems of its
own. If “patent monopoly” is not meant to imply market power, then removal of market
power cannot be the supposed public benefit of patent litigation, and it becomes necessary
to find a different theory to justify the long-standing judicial doctrines (and more recently
proposed reforms) to encourage challenges and discourage settlement. As this Article admits, patent challenges might well produce public benefits other than the one considered
here, but such alternative theories have not been invoked by courts or developed with
much specificity by scholars. See Part I. Instead, the relevant authorities seem to assume
that the benefits of ending “patent monopolies” are self-evident. See note 42 and accompanying text. In short, when courts and commentators speak of “patent monopolies” in this
context, they appear to be drawing on the term’s economic implications as the basis for
promoting patent challenges, not simply using casual language.
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2. Inferring market power from a patent dispute.
As the prior Section discussed, without knowing more, it
would be quite risky to assume that any given patent confers market power. However, if the goal of the inquiry is to understand
how patent challenges affect competition, one might need to ask
a slightly different question: Is it reasonable to assume that patents
that are the subject of challenges confer market power? Whatever
the probability might be that a patent in the general pool confers
market power, it is possible that challenged patents are different
in some way, and that these differences make them more likely to
confer market power than patents at large.85 This Section considers whether it is reasonable to assume that a challenged patent
confers market power.
One reason for thinking that challenged patents might be
more likely to confer market power than patents in general is that
the existence of a patent dispute reveals that the contested rights
have some value to the parties fighting over them. Patent litigation is expensive—the cost of seeing a single case through to trial
can easily reach into the millions of dollars.86 So if a patent is not
important, one would expect that the parties would quickly give
up the fight. But when a patent owner and a challenger are willing to spend significant sums pursuing the conflict, this might
suggest that the patent is one of the minority of patents that indeed confers market power.87
There are really two steps at work in this commonly adopted
inference. The first is that the level of the parties’ investment in
a dispute reflects the private value that those parties have at
stake in that dispute. The second is that the presence of private
value at stake indicates that the challenged patent confers market power. Neither step holds under all conditions.

85 See Katz, 49 Ariz L Rev at 864 (cited in note 33) (postulating that the intellectual
property rights that are litigated are concentrated on “intellectual goods high in commercial value, likely without many close substitutes”).
86 See AIPLA 2015 Report at 37 (cited in note 37).
87 See Miller and Gal, 32 Yale J Reg at 155 (cited in note 18); Brief of Professor F.M.
Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Illinois Tool Works Inc v Independent
Ink, Inc, Docket No 04-1329, *7 (US filed Sept 28, 2005) (available on Westlaw at 2005 WL
2427642) (“The willingness of plaintiffs in American judicial proceedings to expend such
large sums demonstrates that the patents at issue are among the few patents with truly
significant value.”). See also Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 657 (cited in note
18) (arguing that challenges will tend to target patents with greater deadweight losses);
Katz, 49 Ariz L Rev at 864 (cited in note 33).
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The easier of the two steps is the first: the presence of a live
patent dispute suggests there is some significant private value at
stake. Intuitively, it seems irrational to spend more litigating a
case than the case itself is worth.88 So, if the private stakes are
small, it would be better to settle the dispute than to continue
fighting it. For exactly this reason, patent litigation is a generally
accepted indicator of private value.89
However, what is useful as a general indicator does not necessarily hold true in all cases. For example, this inference breaks
down in the context of nuisance suits. The same significant litigation costs that suggest a disputed patent has high private value
also create the opportunity for abuse in low-value cases. Knowing
the costs of defending an infringement claim are high, a patent
holder could bring a weak case in hopes of settling for a share of
the defendant’s avoided defense costs.90 (Symmetrically, a challenger could initiate a claim against a plainly valid patent in
hopes of settling for a share of the patent owner’s costs of fighting
to preserve it.)91 Even if nuisance assertions are common, such
cases should not be expected to proceed very far, since neither
party has an interest in actually litigating them. But when bargaining breaks down or a party miscalculates, it is possible that
such disputes could go on for a surprisingly long time. Because of
the possibility of nuisance claims and other abusive tactics, it is
simply not true that private value must inexorably follow from
the fact of a patent dispute.92
The second step of the inference is more problematic. Once it
is established that a patent dispute does involve significant private value, it is tempting to assume that this value must come

88 See D. Rosenberg and S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value, 5 Intl Rev L & Econ 3, 4 (1985).
89 See John R. Allison, et al, Valuable Patents, 92 Georgetown L J 435, 439–43 (2004);
Jean O. Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window
on Competition, 32 RAND J Econ 129, 129–30 (2001).
90 See Innovation Act Report at 21 (cited in note 17) (describing witnesses’ reports of
such nuisance suits).
91 See Dolin, 56 BC L Rev at 932–34 (cited in note 16).
92 See Salem M. Katsh, Jack E. Brown, and F.M. Scherer, Panel Discussion, The
Value of Patents and Other Legally Protected Commercial Rights, 53 Antitrust L J 535,
547 (1984). Note that a high number of nuisance suits might itself be a reason to restrict
parties’ access to settlement. See generally David Rosenberg and Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits: The Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26
Intl Rev L & Econ 42 (2006). However, this argument for restricting settlement is distinct
from the theory that patent challenges increase competition, and indeed is not limited to
patent cases at all.
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from the disputed patent’s market power. This is, after all, consistent with the most common justification for issuing patents in
the first place: inventors are given valuable market power as a
reward for their inventive contributions.93 So when private value
shows up in a particular patent challenge, it seems reasonable to
think that the patent system is working according to its theory,
and that the challenged patent is indeed one that confers market
power.94
Market power is a plausible explanation for the private value
in a patent challenge, but it is not the only one. In fact, there are
a number of ways a patent suit can come to have private significance without the underlying patent actually conferring market
power. Several of the ways this can happen are better addressed
in subsequent sections, but one will be introduced here to illustrate the basic concept.95
One way that private value can exist without market power
is through the phenomenon of patent holdup. Patent holdup occurs when a firm makes technology-specific investments with imperfect information about the rights that will be necessary to
practice that technology.96 If a firm invests in a technology that
turns out to infringe a patent, the owner of the infringed patent
may be in a position to extract a portion of the value of these investments, potentially up to the cost at which the infringing firm
could switch to an alternate technology.97 When this occurs, the
patent owner may be able to extract rents in excess of what the

93 See Scherer and Ross, Industrial Market Structure at 622 (cited in note 66);
Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law at 296–97 (cited
in note 73).
94 See Katz, 49 Ariz L Rev at 865–67 (cited in note 33) (explaining why enforcement
of patents that confer market power is more likely than enforcement of patents that do
not); Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 652, 657 (cited in note 18).
95 See Part II.B.2 (describing the possibility of portfolio-level litigation) and
Part II.C.2 (describing the possibility of litigation motivated by damages for past infringement). Several commentators have previously observed that social value and private value
in a patent case are not necessarily coterminous. See, for example, Allison, et al, 92
Georgetown L J at 440 (cited in note 89) (distinguishing social value from private value);
Katz, 49 Ariz L Rev at 866–67 (cited in note 33).
96 See Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
Tex L Rev 1991, 1995 (2007) (modeling a situation in which this can occur); Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 Innovation Pol & Economy 119, 125 (2000).
97 See Lemley and Shapiro, 85 Tex L Rev at 2003 (cited in note 96); Alexander Galetovic,
Stephen Haber, and Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J Competition L & Econ 549, 556 (2015) (providing an example of holdup).
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infringer would have been willing to pay if the parties had negotiated before the infringer sunk any costs.98
To illustrate this possibility, consider three firms planning to
sell 3D printers. Each firm spends $10 million designing and prototyping its model. Company A and Company B employ technologies that are completely in the public domain, so they have no
patent liabilities. Company C intends to employ only public domain technology, but unluckily includes a feature in its design
that infringes a patent belonging to some nonpracticing entity, P.
The feature does not add any particular value over A or B’s models, but because it is integrated at a very basic level, C can avoid
infringement only by going back to the drawing board and starting over, incurring another $10 million in design and prototyping
costs. Unless, of course, P grants C a license, which P is perfectly
willing to do—for a fee.
This is a clear case of patent holdup. P’s invention does not
have any benefit over public domain alternatives, so C would not
have agreed to pay anything for the technology if it had had perfect information about the patent landscape before designing its
product. But because C inadvertently sunk investments into P’s
technology without prior arrangement, it has given P an opportunity to extract a one-time payment that reflects the costs of C’s
design-around rather than the value of P’s technology.
The possibility of patent holdup has recently received a substantial amount of attention from scholars.99 But when assessing
the value of patent challenges, courts and commentators have
consistently overlooked that holdup can create significant private
stakes without creating significant consequences for competition.
In the example above, the infringer (C) has an urgent interest in
challenging P’s patent—if C can show the patent is invalid, it can
avoid the need to pay for a license or to change its product. Similarly, P has a very real interest in defending the patent and seeking remedies against C. This dispute clearly involves significant
private stakes, and it would not be at all surprising to find the
parties spending substantial sums to carry on the fight. But the
98

See Lemley and Shapiro, 85 Tex L Rev at 2010–11 (cited in note 96); Katz, 49 Ariz
L Rev at 866 n 154 (cited in note 33) (acknowledging the possibility of “opportunistic”
enforcement).
99 See, for example, Lemley and Shapiro, 85 Tex L Rev at 2010–11 (cited in note 96);
John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex L Rev 2111, 2124–45 (2007);
J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for
Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 Minn L Rev 714, 718–19 (2008);
Galetovic, Haber, and Levine, 11 J Competition L & Econ at 549 (cited in note 97).
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public interest in competition is a different question. Since in this
example C is the only manufacturer facing the holdup threat, P’s
claim does not affect C’s competitors’ costs. Moreover, because P’s
claim gets its value from the threat of forcing a one-time redesign,
the holdup here will not even affect C’s marginal costs going forward. The stakes for competition could therefore be quite small,
notwithstanding the large private interest in the dispute. While
C would love to avoid paying $10 million to P (just as P would love
to collect $10 million from C), whether or not C pays P will not
necessarily have an effect on competition in the relevant product
market—that is, the prices at which Companies A, B, and C will
eventually sell their 3D printers.100
The fact that P is a nonpracticing entity simplifies this example, but it is not the point. If instead of stumbling upon P’s patent,
C had instead inadvertently infringed the patent of some fourth
competitor, Company D, the result would be the same. D would
be in a position to collect a windfall of somewhere between $0 and
$10 million. C’s balance sheet would be set back an equivalent
amount. But, without more, this one-time transfer of cash from
one competitor to another will not necessarily affect the price, volume, or features of 3D printers in the market in which all these
firms compete.101
To be sure, sometimes holdup can affect competition. The extent to which it does will depend on the scope of the patent claims
and the structure of the relevant market. Continuing with the 3D
printer example, the consequences for consumers would be quite
different if all (or even many) of the firms in the market had inadvertently sunk costs based on the same infringing technology,
or if P had separate patents covering each of the respective approaches taken by Companies A, B, and C. As P’s royalty demands begin to affect multiple firms, the likelihood increases that
those firms may be able to pass some portion of these costs on to
consumers, resulting in the higher prices and reduced output that

100 Of course, it is possible to conjure circumstances in which even a one-time payment
could affect competition: for example, if the fee forces a competitor from the market or
dissuades new competitors from entering. The claim here is not that holdup never reduces
competition, only that it does not inexorably lead to that result.
101 The case of holdup involving competitors is more complicated, because it introduces the possibility that the firms will use settlement as an opportunity to diminish their
incentives to compete with each other in the future. For example, if C and D enter an
ongoing royalty arrangement, there may be an effect on future competition. Again, a reduction in competition is possible, though not inevitable.
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are symptomatic of market power.102 But holdup alone does not
create market power. To the contrary, it can vest a patent dispute
with significant private stakes without market power being at issue at all.
Some readers may object at this point on the grounds that
cases of patent holdup are instances in which the patent system
is not functioning correctly and that, as a result, the public has a
special interest in how these cases are resolved. Nothing here suggests otherwise. Patent holdup could very well be a serious systemic problem, since it creates the potential for deviation between
the reward a patent holder receives and the value of the underlying technology. These distributional consequences might justify
policy interventions to make holdup less profitable. And those justifiable interventions might even include measures to encourage
patent challenges.103 But, critically, this would all be rooted in a
different theory of how patent challenges benefit the public—that,
for some reason, patent challenges hold the key to addressing the
pernicious effects of patent holdup. For purposes of the theory
that patent challenges increase competition, patent holdup sometimes will and sometimes will not be associated with market
power. And the cases in which holdup does not involve market
power actually weaken the inference that challenged patents reliably affect competition, since the holdup itself provides an alternate explanation for dispute.
The claim here is not that challenged patents never or even
rarely confer market power. In fact, patent-based market power
might be the single most common explanation for the fact of a patent
dispute.104 But it is not the only explanation, and the existence of
these competing possibilities means that one cannot reliably infer

102 See Federal Trade Commission v Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 US 447, 460–
61 (1986).
103 The “might” in this sentence merits special emphasis, as increasing the rate of
patent challenges is not an obvious or inevitable response to the problem of patent holdup.
The opportunity for holdup occurs because of the difficulty of predicting patent infringement liabilities before sinking costs into particular technologies. Lemley and Shapiro, 85
Tex L Rev at 1995 (cited in note 96). There are a number of policy tools that could be
expected to counteract this—for example, requiring more explicit claims, reducing damages when a defendant demonstrates due diligence to avoid infringement, or issuing fewer
patents in general. It is possible that a generalized policy of encouraging patent challenges
could have a place in a sensible package of reforms to address holdup, but the case for this
would need to be made.
104 See Katz, 49 Ariz L Rev at 866 (cited in note 33).
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market power from the existence of a patent challenge.105 As one
insightful commentator puts it, “[N]ot every dispute that involves
intellectual goods necessarily implies the existence of market
power, [but] a significant number of them probably do.”106 At best
this is a working assumption, not a hard-and-fast rule.
It is difficult to estimate how often this inference fails. At a
minimum, there are at least some litigated cases in which the disputed patent confers no market power at all.107 But even if those
cases could be dismissed as outliers, the potential for divergence
between private interest and public significance likely leads to
overestimation of the benefits of patent challenges in significant
numbers of cases. As subsequent sections discuss, there are a variety of ways a patent suit can become valuable to litigants quite
apart from the market power of the patent in question. Once these
alternate sources of value are considered, the private stakes of a
dispute become a dubious proxy for the competitive significance
of a patent. This complication thus affects both the likelihood that
a given challenge will benefit the public by increasing competition
and the magnitude of those benefits when it does.
B. Successful Challenges Reduce Market Power
Another condition necessary for a patent challenge to increase competition relates to the patent owner’s competitive position in the absence of the challenged patent. Even if that patent
confers market power, invalidating it may not make much difference if its owner’s position is redundantly secured by other means.
When assessing the benefits of patent challenges, courts and
commentators often assume that the removal of a patent will have
the effect of increasing competition.108 But in reality the competitive effects of removing a patent can be more complicated. In some
105

Several other ways that a dispute can take on private significance without necessarily affecting competition are discussed in Parts II.B.2 and II.C.2.
106 Katz, 49 Ariz L Rev at 867 (cited in note 33).
107 The clearest example of this is probably challenges brought against already-expired
patents. See Part II.C.2.
108 Unlike the condition of market power, which is often mentioned quickly, it is rare
to find any discussion—one way or the other—about the possibility of redundant protection reducing the competitive benefits of patent challenges. See, for example, Actavis, 133
S Ct at 2236; Cardinal Chemical, 508 US at 100–01; Blonder-Tongue, 402 US at 342–43;
Lear, 395 US at 663–64; In re Cipro, 348 P3d at 850; Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown
L J at 652, 657, 671 (cited in note 18); Dorr, Note, 51 Denver L J at 113 (cited in note 20);
Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 688–90 (cited in note 14); Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J Econ
Persp at 90–92 (cited in note 18); Burstein, 83 Geo Wash L Rev at 538–42 (cited in note
18). To be clear, in other contexts, many of the same commentators have observed the
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cases, the removal of a single patent may be insufficient to actually make the disputed technology available to the public. Moreover,
the existence of redundant protection—especially large patent
portfolios—may cause firms to spend substantial sums litigating
patents of little individual competitive significance, further weakening the inference that a challenged patent must be one that
confers market power. This Section explores both of these complications in turn.
1. Inventions may remain proprietary despite successful
challenges.
In the standard account, a successful challenge removes an
important technology from the exclusive control of a single competitor and instead places it into the public domain. Even in cases
for which the first half of that description is correct—the disputed
technology is indeed important—the second half requires separate consideration. In many cases, overlapping patent rights can
result in something less than perfect competition even after a patent
is struck down, reducing the benefits available at the end of a successful challenge.
Sometimes a single patent really is all that stands between
the public and open access to an important technology.109 When a
patent like that is removed, the story of what happens next is
simple. The (former) patent owner no longer enjoys market power.
Other firms embrace and improve the now freely available technology. Rigorous competition ensues. This seems to be the picture courts have in mind when assessing the value of patent
challenges.110
Often, however, redundant protection complicates the assumption that a single successful challenge will allow everyone to
begin selling competing products without constraint. In many

possibility of overlapping patent protection. See, for example, Shapiro, 1 Innovation Pol &
Economy at 121 (cited in note 96); Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J Legal Analysis 687, 689 (2010); Lemley and Shapiro, 85 Tex L Rev at 2006
(cited in note 96); Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information without Intellectual Property, 91 Tex L Rev 227, 277–78 (2012).
109 The Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution, Ltd, 526 Fed
Appx 988 (Fed Cir 2013), litigation described below appears to be such an example. See
Part II.C.2.
110 See, for example, Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234–35; In re Cipro, 348 P3d at 850;
Blonder-Tongue, 402 US at 346; Lear, 395 US at 670.
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fields, overlapping patent protection is the norm.111 For example,
the process of building a chip that can communicate over WiFi or
cellular networks easily implicates thousands of patents owned
by dozens of competitors.112 And the problem can get even worse
than that—a finished smartphone might involve hundreds of
thousands of patents.113 In some fields, patent rights may be so
dense and held by so many disparate owners that the result is a
“thicket” that makes further entry cost prohibitive.114
The observation that overlapping and redundant rights can
restrict access to patented technologies is not new. Yet when discussing the benefits of patent challenges, many courts and commentators overlook this complication, apparently assuming that
a single challenger victory will be sufficient to put the disputed
technology in the public domain.115
An accurate assessment of a challenge’s potential benefits for
competition must take redundant barriers to competition like
these into account. When hundreds or thousands of patents are
necessary to make a particular product, the competitive effect of
knocking out one or two of them will be small. Consider, for example, a wireless standard that requires using five hundred different patents (well on the low end, as far as these standards
go).116 Suppose for the sake of illustration that these patents are
111 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn L Rev 1719, 1738–39 (2003).
112 See Lemley and Shapiro, 85 Tex L Rev at 2025–28 (cited in note 96).
113 See id at 1992; David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android (Google, Aug 3,
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/HKA3-QV9A; RPX Corp, Form S-1 Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933 *59 (SEC, Sept 2, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/
2WT3-LPM5; Joel R. Reidenberg, et al, Patents and Small Participants in the Smartphone
Industry *8–9 (Center on Law and Information Policy at Fordham Law School, Jan 15,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3N4H-BUJ9.
114 See generally Shapiro, 1 Innovation Pol & Economy 119 (cited in note 96); Bronwyn
H. Hall, Christian Helmers, and Georg von Graevenitz, Technology Entry in the Presence
of Patent Thickets (IFS Working Paper W16/02, Jan 16, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/B452-YPVM. But see Jonathan M. Barnett, The Anti-Commons Revisited,
29 Harv J L & Tech 127, 135 (2015) (arguing that outside specialized circumstances, anticommons problems are unlikely to arise or persist).
115 See note 108.
116 Yoo-Jin Han, Analysis of Essential Patent Portfolios via Bibliometric Mapping: An
Illustration of Leading Firms in the 4G Era, 27 Tech Analysis & Strategic Mgmt 809, 817
(2015) (noting that thousands of patents have been declared essential to the LTE wireless
standard); In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, 2013 WL 5593609, *2, 41–43
(ND Ill) (crediting testimony that there are about three thousand patents that are potentially essential to the WiFi standard). See also Alexander Galetovic and Kirti Gupta, Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential Patents: Theory and Evidence from the World Mobile
Wireless Industry *13 (Hoover IP2 Working Paper Series No 15012, Feb 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/U5ZZ-S2AU.
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owned by five different owners, with one hundred patents each.117
After a successful challenge to one such patent, competition looks
exactly the same—there may now be only 499 patents at play, but
the permission of all five patent-owning firms is still necessary to
sell a standard-compliant product without infringing. If somehow
the challenger were to succeed in knocking out one hundred patents
all owned by the same company, competition would likely benefit
from the elimination of one of the five essential licensors.118 But
even still, it would be wrong to say the technology is in the public
domain, with four hundred patents still remaining in the hands
of four different firms.
The degree to which patent rights overlap varies by technology area, but it is hardly a fringe phenomenon. Commentators
have noted that large numbers of patents are often necessary to
offer products or implement features in industries such as software, semiconductors, biotechnology, and smartphones.119 Even
in the pharmaceutical industry, long cited as a counterexample in
which patents still map directly onto products, scholars have recently observed that multiple patents are often necessary to actually compete in the marketplace.120
When moving a technology into the public domain is a multistep and uncertain process like this, it is difficult to assess exactly
which steps yield public benefits. For example, sometimes a few
successful challenges may seem initially insignificant, only to become quite important once other barriers to entry disappear. Similarly, if the various patents necessary to use a particular technology expire at different times, knocking out a select group of
117 A high concentration of ownership is typical, though scholars have also observed
a long tail of firms with a handful of patents essential to the standard. See, for example,
Donald J. Goodman and Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents *3–6 (IEEE,
June 13, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/6XV8-W3CS.
118 See Lemley and Shapiro, 85 Tex L Rev at 2014–17 (cited in note 96) (predicting an
increase in the total royalties that must be paid for a product based on the number of firms
holding essential patents); Galetovic and Gupta, Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential
Patents at *13 (cited in note 116). However, competitive harm may not be neatly correlated
with the number of essential licensors. See Lemley and Shapiro, 85 Tex L Rev at 2014–17
(cited in note 96).
119 See, for example, Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How
the Courts Can Solve It 83–92 (Chicago 2009); Shapiro, 1 Innovation Pol & Economy at
119 (cited in note 96); Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci 698, 699 (1998).
120 See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make a
Drug? Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 Mich Telecomm &
Tech L Rev 299, 316–17 (2010). See also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in
Innovation Policy, 13 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 345, 355–56 (2007).
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those patents could hasten the day when the technology enters
the public domain.121 Therefore, in some cases, the effect of redundant protection may be to reduce, rather than eliminate entirely,
a challenge’s potential benefits for competition.
2. Distinguishing patent market power from portfolio
market power.
As the prior Section discussed, redundant protection can reduce or eliminate the procompetitive benefits of a successful patent
challenge. In addition, overlapping patent rights further complicate the inference that litigated patents confer market power in
the first place.122 This Section evaluates how portfolio-level fights
can cause divergence between the private and public interests in
a patent dispute.
When a patent owner and a challenger become enmeshed in
a dispute, it is tempting to assume that the patents that are the
legal subject of the case are also the economic motivation for the
case. Indeed, this is the intuitive and conventional explanation
for what is happening in patent litigation—a challenger is investing in legal process in hopes of acquiring access to a patented technology.123 But sometimes disputants have more complex motivations, and in cases like these, the value of the disputed technology
itself may not fully explain the parties’ actions.
In many industries, it is common for firms to have significant
and diversified patent portfolios, while at the same time having
significant and diversified operations.124 The resulting blend of
patent assets and liabilities creates the possibility of patent disputes with much larger stakes than the availability or cost of any
single technology. Against such a backdrop, any individual patent
case may be part of a much larger battle between firms, and may
have little to do with the technology that happens to be the topic
of legal inquiry.
To illustrate, consider the long-running, multijurisdictional
dispute between Apple and Samsung. The war began in the
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See Part II.C.1 (discussing timing effects).
See Part II.A.2.
123 See, for example, Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J Econ Persp at 88, 91 (cited in note 18);
Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 679–81, 729 (cited in note 14); Elhauge and Krueger, 91
Tex L Rev at 285, 297–98 (cited in note 47); Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at
652, 658 (cited in note 18); Miller and Gal, 32 Yale J Reg at 143 (cited in note 18).
124 See Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U Pa L Rev
1, 27, 43 (2005).
122
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spring of 2011 when Apple sued Samsung in the Northern District
of California for infringement of several of its design patents.125
Samsung swiftly responded, bringing patent complaints against
Apple in Japan, South Korea, and Germany.126 From there, the
dispute quickly spread to other forums, including the District of
Delaware and the International Trade Commission.127 By the end
of the summer, the parties were litigating nineteen cases in nine
countries, seeking injunctions, exclusion orders, and billions of
dollars in damages against each other.128
Five years on, Apple and Samsung have spent hundreds of
millions of dollars on this fight without reaching a conclusion.129
They have endured multiple trials, made repeated trips to the
Federal Circuit, and seen jaw-dropping verdicts handed down and
taken away.130 Clearly, there are significant private interests at

125 See generally Complaint for Patent Infringement, Federal False Designation of
Origin and Unfair Competition, Federal Trademark Infringement, State Unfair Competition, Common Law Trademark Infringement, and Unjust Enrichment, Apple Inc v Samsung
Electronics Co, Civil Action No 11-1846 (ND Cal filed Apr 15, 2011) (available on Westlaw
at 2011 WL 1461508).
126 See Chloe Albanesius, Samsung Countersues Apple for Patent Infringement
(PCMag, Apr 22, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/2ZJ5-L6E2.
127 See generally Apple Inc.’s Complaint under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
as Amended, In the Matter of Certain Electronic Digital Media Devices and Components
Thereof, Inv No 337-TA-796 (ITC filed July 5, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL
3556057); Complaint for Patent Infringement, Samsung Electronics Co v Apple Inc, Case
No 11-cv-00573 (D Del filed June 29, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 2566600).
128 Florian Mueller, Apple vs. Samsung: List of All 19 Lawsuits Going On in 12 Courts
in 9 Countries on 4 Continents (Foss Patents, Aug 20, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/T6W7-6TNY. See also Chloe Albanesius, Every Place Samsung and Apple
Are Suing Each Other (PCMag, Sept 14, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/HW6M-PER5;
Mike Snider and Jon Swartz, Apple-Samsung Legal Outcome Won’t Likely End Feud (USA
Today, May 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3R5R-HLUW; Tim Bradshaw and Simon
Mundy, Apple Ruling Redraws Battle Lines (Aug 26, 2012), online at http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/fa28dc5a-ef55-11e1-b1e5-00144feabdc0.html (visited Sept 18, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable); Choe Sang-Hun, Samsung Wants Courts in 2 Nations to Bar iPhone
(NY Times, Oct 5, 2011), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/technology/
samsung-to-seek-block-on-iphone-in-europe.html (visited Aug 26, 2016) (Perma archive
unavailable).
129 Apple’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Apple Inc v Samsung Electronics Co, Case No
11-cv-01846, *7 (ND Cal filed Dec 5, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 8445649).
See also Jennifer Smith and Steve Eder, How Apple Got Its Case Across: Lawyers Presented
a Clear Story Line for Technology Giant; Samsung’s Argument Was Harder to Explain
(Wall St J, Aug 26, 2012), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044423
0504577613663578617748 (visited Oct 18, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable).
130 See, for example, Apple, Inc v Samsung Electronics Co, 926 F Supp 2d 1100, 1120
(ND Cal 2013) (ordering a new trial on $450 million of damages while upholding $599
million of the jury’s award); Michael B.G. Froman, United States Trade Representative,
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stake in this dispute. But it would be missing the forest for the
trees to view each case in isolation, as if the motivation for this
multiyear, multinational, multimillion-dollar battle was really to
secure access to features like swiping to unlock a smartphone or
automatically detecting whether an external microphone is connected.131 Rather, it is widely understood that these individual,
patent-level fights are really tactical salvos to obtain more favorable terms in an eventual global settlement.132
Portfolio-level litigation like this further complicates the relationship between the private stakes in a dispute and the market
power of the patents at issue. Apple holds over ten thousand US
patents; Samsung holds more than one hundred thousand
(though not all related to smartphones).133 Undoubtedly, each firm
enjoys some degree of market power as a result of its patent portfolio. But it is difficult to reach any conclusions about the competitive significance of the individual patents at issue, because the
fight between the firms is so much larger. Moreover, it is quite
possible that each firm’s market power would remain practically
unchanged no matter how these particular cases are resolved.134
This wrinkle is a direct consequence of a trend, previously
noted by Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Polk Wagner, in
which the value of patents has less to do with their individual
Letter to Irving A. Williamson, Chairman of the United States International Trade Commission *3 (Aug 3, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/8X7K-J68Y (vetoing the exclusion
order of the iPhone 4, iPad 3G, and various earlier models).
131 For a description of the technologies at issue, see Amended Complaint for Patent
Infringement, Apple Inc v Samsung Electronics Co, Case No 12-cv-00630, *4–5 (ND Cal
filed Aug 31, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 3793136); Imran Chaudhri, et al,
Unlocking a Device by Performing Gestures on an Unlock Image, US Patent No 8,046,721
(filed June 2, 2009); Limited Exclusion Order, In the Matter of Certain Electronic Digital
Media Devices and Components Thereof, Inv No 337-TA-796, *2–3 (ITC filed Aug 9, 2013);
Timothy Johnson and Achim Pantfoerder, Audio I/O Headset Plug and Plug Detection
Circuitry, US Patent No 7,912,501 (filed Jan 5, 2007).
132 See Victoria Ho, Little Real Consumer Impact from Apple-Samsung Fight, Business Times Singapore (Aug 30, 2012) (observing that “these complex patent battles tend
to result in global settlements with cross-licensing deals”); Miyoung Kim, Samsung Can
Bounce Back from Defeat (TradeArabia, Aug 25, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/U99T
-NG5C (predicting that an eventual settlement will leave the two firms “firmly in control
of the $200 billion-plus global smartphone market”).
133 Details are available in the Patent Assignment Database (US Patent and Trademark Office), archived at http://perma.cc/7BHE-5VXA.
134 In the case of Apple and Samsung, each firm enjoys numerous competitive advantages and extremely valuable intellectual property, and would likely continue to do so
with or without the individual patents at issue in these cases. See The World’s Most Valuable
Brands (Forbes, 2016), online at http://www.forbes.com/powerful-brands/list/ (visited Aug 26,
2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (ranking Apple first and Samsung eleventh on a list of
the most valuable brands).
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significance and more to do with their role in a firm’s larger patent
portfolio.135 As Parchomovsky and Wagner observe, a strategic collection of distinct-but-related patents may confer advantages on
their holders that individual patents cannot.136 As a result, it is
possible that the market power underlying a dispute comes from
the strength of a firm’s portfolio, rather than the importance of
any individual patent in that portfolio.137
The effect of patent portfolios may be to either raise or reduce
the competitive significance of individual patent litigations. For
example, if a firm holds a few patents on all of the practical ways
of building a particular product, a seemingly unimportant case
involving just one of those patents could hold the key to introducing competition in the relevant market.138 On the other hand, if a
firm enjoys massively redundant patent protection (as Apple and
Samsung do), any single patent case may have little chance of
making much difference for the overall competitiveness of the
field—the remedies available to a patent court (declaring the
patents before it invalid or noninfringed) are just too narrow. But,
critically, the difference between the first case and the second
cannot be inferred from the parties’ apparent interest in the litigation. The full picture of the dispute may be much larger than
the individual patents that happen to be before the court.
C. The Patent Challenge Is Timely
A third condition necessary for patent challenges to increase
competition relates to timing. Even if an individual patent is a
but-for source of market power, a challenge may have little effect
on competition if it does not take effect until it is too late. Because
patent-derived market power is already time limited, any additional benefit for competition has to come from ending that market power sooner, rather than just at all. This Section evaluates

135 See Parchomovsky and Wagner, 154 U Pa L Rev at 27, 43 (cited in note 124). See
also John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent
Portfolios, 69 Antitrust L J 851, 853–56 (2001) (describing the use of portfolios in the semiconductor and biotechnology sectors).
136 Parchomovsky and Wagner, 154 U Pa L Rev at 27–28 (cited in note 124).
137 See Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 Duke L J 89, 103 (2013);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 Georgetown L J 2133,
2139 (2012); Kitch, 53 Vand L Rev at 1739 (cited in note 66).
138 See, for example, Rite–Hite Corp v Kelley Co, 56 F3d 1538, 1548 (Fed Cir 1995)
(observing that the only acceptable substitute product that would not infringe the patent
in suit would infringe a different patent held by the plaintiff).
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how the timing of patent challenges affects their potential to increase competition.
1. Potential benefits of a challenge diminish with time.
Courts commonly describe the costs of an invalid patent using an implicitly static model. If the patent remains in force, it
imposes some monopoly deadweight loss; if the patent challenge
is successful, competition ensues and these losses are avoided.139
This framing obscures the temporal nature of patent rights and
can lead to overestimation of the competitive consequences of patent challenges.
Both legally and practically, the exclusive rights granted by
a patent are limited in time. By statute, a patent expires twenty
years after its application filing date.140 Upon expiration, the invention passes into the public domain and is free for anyone to
use without payment of royalties.141 Moreover, patents may become technologically or economically obsolete long before they
expire.142 New inventions make the old ways comparatively undesirable, demoting what was previously the cutting edge to a secondor third-best position.143 Even if the original technology remains
important, subsequent developments may render the scope of its
patent protection inadequate by revealing trivial ways to design
around and avoid the patent owner’s exclusive rights.144
These temporal constraints on patent rights must be taken
into account to assess whether (and how much) a challenge increases competition over the appropriately conceived baseline.
The exclusive rights of a patent will necessarily end of their own
139 See, for example, Blonder-Tongue, 402 US at 342–43; Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234;
Lear, 395 US at 663–64; In re Cipro, 348 P3d at 850.
140 35 USC § 154(a)(2). Terms are presumptively twenty years from the application’s
filing date, but they can be adjusted slightly to account for delays at the Patent Office. See
35 USC § 154(b). Patents that were granted based on applications pending prior to June
8, 1995, have the option of an alternative term calculation based on issue date. See 35 USC
§ 154(c).
141 Kimble v Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S Ct 2401, 2407 (2015).
142 See Kitch, 8 Rsrch L & Econ at 34, 38–39 (cited in note 84).
143 See Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 Mgmt Sci 804, 808 (2004) (describing the short life span and high costs of semiconductor facilities).
144 For example, the development of compact, low-power computer systems made it
easy to avoid claims written with older platforms in mind. See generally Hughes Aircraft
Co v United States, 717 F2d 1351 (Fed Cir 1983); Energy Transportation Group, Inc v
William Demant Holding A/S, 697 F3d 1342 (Fed Cir 2012). In some cases, the doctrine
of equivalents may be available to update old claim language to the new technology. See
Energy Transportation Group, 697 F3d at 1352–55.
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accord in some fixed number of years following their grant. Because of this inevitable end, the issue in a patent challenge is
never really whether the patented technology will belong to a single owner or be placed into the public domain. Rather, it is a question of when it enters the public domain.
Understood this way, the potential benefits for competition
depend significantly on when a patent challenge occurs.145 Early
in a valuable patent’s life, a patent challenge has the potential to
free the public of many years of patent-based exclusivity. But with
each passing day, the moments of technological obsolescence and
legal expiration draw nearer, and the promised benefits for competition shrink accordingly. At some point (certainly on the day
the patent expires, but oftentimes before then), a successful patent
challenge will have no forward-going effect on competition
whatsoever.146
Time takes a toll on every patent challenge. Almost inevitably, some of a patent’s term is spent before a patent challenge
even begins. In fact, the average patent suit by a product-producing
company begins about nine years after the disputed patent was
filed.147 Once a patent challenge does commence, adjudicating the
dispute typically takes years—one study observed a median time
from filing of suit to judgment of 658 days.148 And that is just the
time until the district court’s work is complete.149 Appeals, reversals, retrials, and so on can easily tack on years.150 Given the
145 The word “potential” should be emphasized here, because these timing effects are
independent of the other requirements necessary for a patent challenge to increase competition. The following discussion assumes a successful challenge to a patent that is a butfor cause of reduced competition. See Parts II.A–B, D.
146 In a recent study, Professors Alberto Galasso and Mark Schankerman tested the
effect that a decision by the Federal Circuit invalidating a patent has on future citation to
that patent, using these inbound citations as a proxy for increased follow-on innovation in
the relevant technology area. Consistent with the prediction above that the competitive
effects of a patent challenge diminish as a patent ages, they found that the citation effect
was larger for younger patents—and that there was no effect for patents invalidated fifteen years after issuance. Galasso and Schankerman, 130 Q J Econ at 343–44 (cited in
note 59).
147 See Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls without Harming Innovators?, 161 U Pa L Rev 1309, 1335
(2013). The average suit brought by a nonpracticing entity begins even later. Id.
148 See Jay P. Kesan and Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 Wash U
L Rev 237, 288 (2006).
149 See id at 266 n 192.
150 Patent textbooks are largely populated with cases that were not resolved quickly.
Perhaps the most famous example is the Festo family of opinions. The case began in 1988
and went to trial in 1994. After multiple interventions by the Supreme Court and en banc
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time-limited nature of patents and all of the legal process that
must occur before a challenge is complete, it would be wrong to
conclude that patent challenges free the public from a perpetual
or even twenty-year monopoly.151
Further complicating matters, it is difficult to state any general conclusions about the stage of adjudication that must be
reached for a patent challenge’s effects on competition to take
hold. In some instances, an intermediate ruling by the district
court may signal the challenged patent’s weakness, and thus allow the challenger or competitors to enter the market or expand
output based on increased expectations of the challenge’s success.
For example, before a patent trial, a district court will hold a
Markman hearing to determine what the asserted claims actually
mean.152 If the court construes the claims extremely broadly or
extremely narrowly, this intermediate order may foretell a high
likelihood that the patent will later be found invalid or not infringed. In a case like that, the benefits for competition may begin
to accrue shortly after the claim construction order, when the
signs of a likely victory become clear to the challenger and other
competitors. But other cases are not like that. Sometimes a claim
construction order favors the patent holder or is ambiguous in
light of facts that remain to be determined at trial. And it is always possible that a contested claim construction will later be
overturned on appeal.153 For the same reason, even the district
decisions by the Federal Circuit, the case was finally decided in 2007. See Festo Corp v
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 493 F3d 1368, 1370–76 (Fed Cir 2007) (summarizing the case history); Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 553 US 1093,
1093 (2008) (denying certiorari). One of the patents at issue in the case expired in 1999,
the other in 1990. See Festo Corp v Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co, 1993 WL
1510657, *7, 12–13 (D Mass). A more recent example is the decade-long litigation between
Akamai and Limelight, which was resolved only after a jury trial, five Federal Circuit
opinions, and a trip to the Supreme Court. See generally Akamai Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, 805 F3d 1368 (Fed Cir 2015), cert denied, 136 S Ct 1661 (2016); Akamai
Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, 797 F3d 1020 (Fed Cir 2015) (en banc) (per
curiam); Akamai Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, 786 F3d 899 (Fed Cir 2015);
Limelight Networks, Inc v Akamai Technologies, Inc, 134 S Ct 2111 (2014); Akamai Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, 692 F3d 1301 (Fed Cir 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); Akamai Technologies, Inc v Limelight Networks, Inc, 629 F3d 1311 (Fed Cir 2010).
The patent at issue expires in 2019. See F. Thomson Leighton and Daniel M. Lewin, Global
Hosting System, US Patent No 6,108,703 (filed May 19, 1999).
151 Note that the timelines for recently created administrative review proceedings in
the Patent Office can be quite different—a topic explored in Part III.A.
152 See Markman v Westview Instruments, Inc, 517 US 370, 388 (1996).
153 See J. Jonas Anderson and Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw U L Rev 1, 6, 36
(2014) (observing a 25.6 percent reversal rate on a per-claim basis between 2005 and 2011).
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court’s determination of infringement or validity may not always
trigger immediate benefits for competition, as one or more appeals may be necessary to fully resolve the challenge—a process
that can take years.154 Therefore, depending on the case, a challenge’s consequences for competition can accrue gradually and
may not be fully realized until the litigation is complete.
In many patent cases, the effects of time likely reduce, but do
not eliminate, the incremental benefits a patent challenge may
yield for competition. For example, in the data observed by one
study, the median patent case was adjudicated 11.3 years after
the underlying patent was filed155—about 56 percent of the way
through a presumptive 20-year term. Ignoring the effects of time
could thus lead to a significant overestimation of the competitive
harms avoided by a successful patent challenge. Of course, this
does not mean the median patent challenge produces no benefit.
While the public benefits of eliminating 8.7 years of patent-based
market power are less than the benefits of eliminating 20 years of
patent-based market power, they can nonetheless be substantial.156
But there are also cases in which the passage of time may
erode the bulk of any potential benefits for competition. For example, according to one study, about a quarter of all patent suits
did not even begin until the last five years of the disputed patent’s
life—and, again, patent litigation itself often drags on for years.157
The combination of late filing and noninstantaneous adjudication
means that a significant number of patent challenges are not resolved until quite late in a patent’s life: 13.2 percent of patent
It is possible that such reversals will become less common in light of recently increased
deference in questions of claim construction. See Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v
Sandoz, Inc, 135 S Ct 831, 835 (2015).
154 See note 150.
155 John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q J 185, 236 (1998). Note that, given the age of this study, the
majority of patents it observed would have had terms calculated by adding seventeen years
to their issue date. See Patricia Montalvo, Comment, How Will the New Twenty-Year Patent
Term Affect You? A Look at the Trips Agreement and the Adoption of a Twenty-Year Patent
Term, 12 Santa Clara High Tech L J 139, 143–44, 147–48 (1996). The distinction here is
minor: the median patent case was adjudicated 7.8 years after the disputed patent issued,
Allison and Lemley, 26 AIPLA Q J at 236 (cited in note 155), or about 46 percent of the
way through a term calculated using the old methodology.
156 For example, in the pharmaceutical context, each year of patent term avoided
sometimes yields hundreds of millions of dollars in public benefits. See note 59 and accompanying text.
157 See Love, 161 U Pa L Rev at 1341 (cited in note 147). These late-in-life patent
filings are disproportionately filed by nonpracticing entities. Id at 1340–41. Among nonpracticing entities, the number is even higher—38.2 percent of suits are filed within five
years of expiration. Id at 1341.

1984

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1943

suits filed by product-producing companies terminated in the last
three years of the statutory patent term, while 49.6 percent of
suits filed by nonpracticing entities resolved this late.158 Another
study confirmed the existence of these late-in-life adjudications:
substantial numbers of cases were resolved in the thirteenth or
fourteenth year after the patent was granted, significant numbers
through the twentieth, and some litigation even took place as late
as year twenty-five.159 Although statistics are not available on this
point, a nonnegligible number of patent challenges appear to involve patents that have already expired.
One might wonder why litigants would continue fighting over
a patent near or after its expiration date. The short answer (elaborated upon in the next Section) is that these cases include claims
for past damages, and thus can involve significant private stakes
long after the disputed patent has expired.160 But any potential
for the resolution of these cases to affect future competition has
clearly come and gone.161
As with the conditions discussed in the prior sections, this
complication does not mean patent challenges can never produce
public benefits. In fact, the rate of litigation tends to peak in the

158

Id at 1341.
See Allison, et al, 92 Georgetown L J at 477 (cited in note 89). It is possible that
some of this extremely late litigation involves drug patents awarded extended terms under
35 USC § 156, which allows for up to five additional years of patent term to compensate
for delays in the FDA approval process. See Eli Lilly & Co v Medtronic, Inc, 496 US 661,
669–74 (1990) (explaining the operation of this provision). See also Eisenberg, 13 Mich
Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 351–52 (cited in note 120). However, this explanation cannot
account for all late-stage litigation, since such cases can be found involving nonpharmaceutical patents as well. See note 150 (describing the Festo family of opinions). For examples of nonpharmaceutical cases open as of this writing and involving patents with less
than a year of term remaining, see generally Bally Gaming, Inc v Euniverse, Inc, Case No
03-cv-00062 (D Nev filed Jan 31, 2003) (involving US Patent No 5,816,918); Pall Corp v
3M Purification, Inc, Case No 03-cv-00092 (EDNY filed Jan 8, 2003) (involving US Patent
Nos 4,680,118, 5,690,765, and 5,543,047).
160 See, for example, Complaint, Pall Corp v Cuno Inc, Case No 03-cv-00092, *5
(EDNY filed Jan 8, 2003) (available on Westlaw at 2003 WL 24229717).
161 These cases could have an effect on future competition if courts would enforce
agreements to pay royalties on sales after a patent expires. For example, if the owner of
an important patent licensed an entire industry on the condition that they pay royalties
for a hundred years, there might well be a public interest in a challenge to that patent so
long as the obligation to pay royalties was in force. But the Supreme Court recently affirmed
its long-standing rule that such terms are not enforceable, ensuring that the public’s competitive interest in a patent challenge really does end by the time the patent does. See
Kimble, 135 S Ct at 2413 (reaffirming a “categorical principle that all patents, and all
benefits from them, must end when their terms expire”).
159
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early years of a patent’s life,162 suggesting that many patent challenges at least begin at a time when they have the potential to
benefit the public. But substantial numbers of challenges begin
later than that, and all litigation takes time. The later a challenge
is resolved, the smaller its potential effect on prospective
deadweight losses. In some cases, the effects of timing may cause
a patent challenge to become incapable of having any forwardgoing effect on competition at all.
2. Distinguishing future significance from past liabilities.
There is yet another way that overlooking the effects of time
can lead to misconceptions about the value of patent challenges.
Recall that, because few patents turn out to be technically or economically significant, it is common to try to infer that a given patent
confers market power from the fact that the parties find it worthwhile to fight over it.163 As the prior sections have noted, there are
a number of ways that inference can fail.164 In addition, the passage of time and the accumulation of damages can cause divergence between the private and public significance of a dispute,
further weakening the inference that the private value of a patent
suit comes from patent market power.
Patent challenges are often conceived of as cases of prospective entry: the patent holder enjoys a monopoly in a properly defined product market, and the challenger is a potential competitor
waiting in the wings.165 Because the challenger has not yet entered the market, no liabilities for past infringement are in the
picture—the dispute is entirely about who may practice the invention in the future. This posture supports the common inference
that a challenged patent must be one that confers market power.
Otherwise, if the disputed technology was not important, why
would the incumbent firm and the potential entrant bother
fighting over it?166

162

See Allison, et al, 92 Georgetown L J at 477 (cited in note 89).
See Part II.A.1.
164 See Parts II.A.2 and II.B.2.
165 See, for example, Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2233; Lear, 395 US at 670–71; BlonderTongue, 402 US at 346–47; Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J Econ Persp at 88, 91 (cited in note
18); Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 679–81, 729 (cited in note 14); Elhauge and Krueger,
91 Tex L Rev at 285, 297–98 (cited in note 47); Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at
652, 658 (cited in note 18).
166 See Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 657–58 (cited in note 18); Katz, 49
Ariz L Rev at 864 (cited in note 33).
163
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There are indeed some cases that look like this. For example,
challenges to pharmaceutical patents under the Hatch-Waxman
Act are almost always cases of prospective entry. The Act itself
ensures that pharmaceutical patent owners will have the opportunity to sue for infringement before any allegedly infringing
sales are made in the United States.167 Moreover, the commencement of patent litigation in this way automatically delays FDA
approval of the generic for thirty months.168 After that, the challenger may have the option of entering before the case is over, but
that is a risky option, in practice rarely invoked.169 Throughout
the life of a Hatch-Waxman challenge, control over future drug
sales remains firmly the focal point. As a result, Hatch-Waxman
cases almost always involve patents with multiple years of term
ahead, and never involve expired patents.170
However, this is not how most patent disputes come about.171
Outside of the pharmaceutical industry, it is rare for potential
patent defendants to seek out licenses in advance, and it is quite
difficult for patent holders to commence suit before some use or
sale of the invention has occurred.172 A typical case comes to court
because a patent holder has observed some conduct she believes
167 FDA-regulated drugs may not be sold without prior approval. 21 USC § 355(a).
Beginning the approval process as a generic challenger constitutes a technical act of infringement, which gives the patent-holding firm an opportunity to file suit. 35 USC
§ 271(e)(2). See also FTC Generic Drug Study at *6–7 (cited in note 14).
168 See FTC Generic Drug Study at *6–7 (cited in note 14).
169 See Panattoni, 30 J Health Econ at 132–33, 136 (cited in note 59). There is some
variation in whether generic challengers who prevail in district court take the risk of entering at the soonest possible moment or wait to see the outcome of the appeal. However,
those who take the risk of entry pending appeal overwhelmingly prevail on appeal, so
damages almost never accrue. See FTC Generic Drug Study at *22 (cited in note 14).
170 The average period of exclusivity remaining at the end of a Hatch-Waxman challenge is 6.5 years. See Panattoni, 30 J Health Econ at 127 (cited in note 59). Patents with
less than a year left are rare, and patents that have expired are nonexistent. See id at
134–35.
171 Hatch-Waxman litigation comprises less than 10 percent of all patent cases. According to data provided by Lex Machina, of the 10,891 patent complaints filed in 2014
and 2015, 900 involved abbreviated new drug applications—approximately 8.3 percent.
This is consistent with data previously reported by Professors Christopher A. Cotropia and
Mark A. Lemley, who found 1,871 district court opinions in patent infringement cases decided between January 2006 and February 2008, with 78 of those addressing abbreviated
new drug applications—about 6.7 percent. See Christopher A. Cotropia and Mark A. Lemley,
Copying in Patent Law, 87 NC L Rev 1421, 1444, 1451 & n 125 (2009).
172 See The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition *51–55, 80–81 (FTC, Mar 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/JL7Z-V5VJ; Mark A.
Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 Mich St L Rev 19, 21–22; Panattoni, 30 J Health Econ at
126 (cited in note 59) (“FDA regulated drugs are the only products for which potential
competitors must resolve conflicting patent claims before entering.”).
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to be infringing and has failed to reach agreement with the alleged infringer.173 The patent suit follows entry, not the other way
around.
This sequence of events introduces a private interest wholly
missing from a hypothetical case of prospective entry: damages
for past infringement. Once some allegedly infringing act has occurred, the private value of a dispute will typically involve the
questions of both who must pay compensation for past use of the
technology and who has the right to control it in the future. These
dual motivations make it impossible to equate the parties’ private
motivations for the case with the future competitive significance
of the technology. Damages give the parties a financial interest
that can exist with or without any consequences for the public’s
interest in future competition.
Moreover, because patent adjudication is not instantaneous,
the blend of past and future interests that make up the private
value of a dispute will shift over time. A case that starts off being
predominantly about the future—motivated, say, by both the
prospect of damages for the past six months and control over the
technology for the next five years—might be predominantly about
the past by the time the challenge is complete. Five years on,
those same parties may find they still have plenty worth fighting
over, but that does not mean the patented technology remains important for the public. As a case goes on, the private stakes in the
litigation tend to increase, even as the forward-going consequences for competition decrease. (Indeed, without this effect it
would be very hard to explain why any case continues after the
underlying patent has expired.)174
The passage of time can cause the private and public significance of a patent challenge to diverge in otherwise-unremarkable

173 Potential infringers need not sit around and wait to be sued. Procedural mechanisms allow a potential infringer to take matters into her own hands, either by bringing
her patent challenge in the form of a declaratory judgment action or by invoking administrative review in the Patent Office. See La Belle, 20 Geo Mason L Rev at 57, 60–62 (cited
in note 18). To bring a declaratory judgment action, the prospective infringer needs to at
least have planned (if not actually taken) concrete steps toward the allegedly infringing
activity. See SanDisk Corp v STMicroelectronics, Inc, 480 F3d 1372, 1381 (Fed Cir 2007).
Like Hatch-Waxman challenges, such cases are atypical—according to data from Lex
Machina, declaratory judgment actions constitute less than 10 percent of patent cases.
The new administrative review procedures created by the AIA are discussed in Part III.A.
174 See notes 157–62 and accompanying text.
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cases. For example, consider a recent Federal Circuit case involving Metso Minerals and Powerscreen International.175 The case
began in March 2006, after Metso sued its direct competitor for
past and ongoing infringement of its patent on a mobile, roadhauled material processing plant.176 On all accounts, this challenge seemed likely to produce public benefits. It did not appear
to be a case of patent holdup.177 The dispute came neither particularly early nor late in the patent’s life—the patent was issued in
1996, and would not expire until 2014.178 The market for this technology was significant—Metso and Powerscreen’s sales alone exceeded $200 million,179 and there were three other competitors
potentially infringing the patent as well.180 This was not a case
of a portfolio-level fight; Metso asserted a single patent, and
Powerscreen did not counter with any claims of infringement of
its own patents.181 But for the patent in this case, the market was
quite competitive.182 In short, there was every reason to believe
that exclusive use of the patented technology provided a significant competitive advantage and that a successful challenge would
put the technology squarely in the public domain.
175 See generally Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution, Ltd,
526 Fed Appx 988 (Fed Cir 2013).
176 See Complaint, Metso Minerals Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd,
Case No 06-cv-01446, *3 (EDNY filed Mar 29, 2006) (“Metso’s Complaint”).
177 In the words of the district court, “The Defendants admitted at the trial that they
were aware of Metso’s ‘618 patent during the 1998 design of the Defendants’ infringing
mobile screeners.” Memorandum of Decision and Order, Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen
International Distribution Ltd, Case No 06-cv-01446, *6 (EDNY filed Dec 8, 2011).
178 Metso’s earliest US filing date was September 7, 1994, so the twenty-year term
expired on September 7, 2014. See Malachy J. Rafferty, Mobile Aggregate Material Processing Plant, US Patent No 5,577,618 (filed Sept 7, 1994); Plaintiff Metso’s Motion for
Attorney Fees, Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd, Case No
06-cv-01446, *1 (EDNY filed March 17, 2011) (“Metso’s Motion for Attorney Fees”) (“Metso
s[eeks] . . . damages from October 2007 through the expiration of Metso’s patent on September 7, 2014.”).
179 See Transcript of Trial, in Joint Appendix, Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd, Civil Action No 11-01572, JA0017445–46 (Fed Cir 2013).
180 Plaintiff Metso’s Motion for a Permanent Injunction, Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd, Civil Action No 06-01446, *6 (EDNY filed Jan 19,
2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 861625) (“Metso’s Motion for a Permanent Injunction”). See also Brian O’Sullivan, The Crunch Bunch, 41 Intl Construction 25, 26
(Sept 2002).
181 See generally Answer and Counterclaims, Metso Minerals Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd, Civil Action No 06-cv-01446 (EDNY filed June 16, 2006) (available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 5281362) (“Powerscreen’s Answer”); Metso’s Complaint (cited
in note 176). Metso and its various subsidiaries did hold a portfolio of several hundred
patents at the time, but none appears immediately relevant to this technology, and they
never entered the dispute.
182 Metso’s Motion for a Permanent Injunction at *5–6 (cited in note 180).
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In the beginning, Powerscreen’s interest in challenging the
patent seemed to align with the public’s interest in increased competition. Along these lines, the challenger invested substantial
sums—likely into the millions of dollars183—making arguments
that if successful would have made the invention freely available
to all.184 But things did not go as Powerscreen hoped. Instead, in
2010, a jury found the patent valid and willfully infringed by
Powerscreen, and awarded Metso $15.8 million in compensatory
damages.185 After the trial, the court entered a permanent injunction that prohibited Powerscreen from selling eleven of its models
found to infringe Metso’s patent.186 The court also awarded interest and doubled Metso’s damages based on the jury’s willfulness
finding, bringing Powerscreen’s total liability to well over $31
million.187
By now Powerscreen clearly had plenty at stake in the litigation, and so it continued its fight with postjudgment motions and
ultimately an appeal.188 At last, its challenge fell on receptive
ears. On May 14, 2013, the Federal Circuit decided Metso’s patent
was obvious and reversed the district court.189 The previously patented material processor was at last in the public domain. 190
Ignoring the passage of days, this would seem to be a significant victory for consumers—thanks to Powerscreen’s efforts, a
clearly valuable technology once exclusively in the hands of a
single competitor was now free for all to use. But by the time
183 Although Powerscreen’s costs are not a matter of public record, Metso claimed that
the litigation cost it over $7 million. Metso’s Motion for Attorney Fees at *4 (cited in note 178).
184 See Powerscreen’s Answer at *9–10 (cited in note 181).
185 See Metso’s Motion for Attorney Fees at *1 (cited in note 178).
186 See Permanent Injunction Order, Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International
Distribution Ltd, Case No 06-cv-01446, *1 (EDNY filed Jan 19, 2011). The court delayed
implementation of the injunction until July 2011. See Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen
International Distribution Ltd, 788 F Supp 2d 71, 77–78 (EDNY 2011). It later modified
and clarified the injunction. See Order, Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International
Distribution Ltd, Case No 06-cv-01446, *2–3 (EDNY filed July 21, 2011).
187 See Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd, 833 F Supp
2d 333, 341 (EDNY 2011).
188 See generally Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, Metso Minerals Inc v Powerscreen International
Distribution Ltd, Case No 06-cv-01446 (EDNY filed Apr 5, 2011); Notice of Appeal, Metso
Minerals Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd, Case No 06-cv-01446 (EDNY
filed Aug 18, 2011).
189 See Metso Minerals, 526 Fed Appx at 998.
190 See generally Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution, Ltd,
134 S Ct 933 (2014) (denying certiorari). See also Blonder-Tongue, 402 US at 343 (holding
that collateral estoppel applies to a patentee in all future cases once a patent claim has
been ruled invalid).
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Powerscreen accomplished this, the patent was nearly at its expiration date anyway. Comparing the date of the Federal Circuit’s
order to the end of the patent’s term, Powerscreen’s costly efforts
accelerated the technology’s entry into the public domain by less
than sixteen months.191 What’s more, it is not clear that the patent
remained economically important so late in its life. Powerscreen
represented to the district court that it had completed a designaround on June 23, 2011192—nearly two years before the litigation would ultimately conclude. Indeed, on February 29, 2012,
Powerscreen reported to its investors in a securities filing that it
had implemented a noninfringing alternative design across its entire product line, and as a result claimed that “the judgment and
injunction do not affect the continued sale or use of any current
model of Powerscreen mobile screening plants.”193 On appeal to
the Federal Circuit, Powerscreen invoked multiple arguments in
hopes of reducing the district court’s damages award, but did not
even raise the issue of the ongoing, permanent injunction entered
against it.194 By the time the case concluded, it seems the parties
were fighting entirely over the past.
191 It is possible that Powerscreen’s decision to challenge Metso’s patent lowered the
costs of other firms in the industry, which apparently used similar technology for years
without paying royalties to or being sued by Metso. See text accompanying note 180. (This
possibility can be only speculative based on the facts available in the public record, since
it was never determined whether these other firms were indeed infringing, and it is possible that, at some point, one or more of them took a license from Metso confidentially.)
But even supposing these other firms were using the patented technology for many years
without a license, it can hardly be said that they were off the hook while Powerscreen’s
challenge was pending. As long as Metso’s patent remained valid, these competitors would
expect that their decisions about how many units to sell (and whether to develop noninfringing
alternatives) could potentially affect their future damages liability—particularly after the
district court found Metso’s patent valid and infringed by Powerscreen. Thus, the Metso
patent likely continued to reduce competition as the case wore on, notwithstanding
Powerscreen’s pending challenge.
192 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Rule 59 and 60 Motion to Alter,
Amend or Vacate the Permanent Injunction and Opposition to Plaintiff Metso’s Motion to
Amend the Court’s Permanent Injunction Order, Metso Minerals Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd, Case No 06-cv-01446, *7 (EDNY filed June 23, 2011) (available
on Westlaw at 2011 WL 11708241).
193 See Terex Corp, Form 10-K Annual Report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2011 *34 (SEC,
Feb 29, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/HT6K-YRJW. In some circumstances, a noninfringing substitute may be more expensive or less desirable than the original infringing
model, which may mean that the patent retains competitive significance despite the availability of an alternative design.
194 See Brief for Defendants-Appellants Powerscreen International Distribution, Limited (Now Known as Terex GB Limited), Powerscreen New York, Inc., and Emerald Equipment Systems, Inc., Metso Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution, Ltd,
Case Nos 2011-1572, 2012-1168, 2012-1169, *85 (Fed Cir filed Aug 2, 2012) (available on
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The Metso-Powerscreen litigation illustrates the perils of inferring competitive significance from the fact that two parties
find a patent dispute worth fighting. From the very beginning,
Powerscreen was facing substantial liability for its past conduct,
since it had been selling the accused product continuously for
nearly six years.195 And, as the litigation dragged on, even the parties’ prospective interests morphed into backward-looking liability as well—potential damages for 2007, 2008, 2009, and so on.196
By the time the case came before the Federal Circuit, Powerscreen
had at least $31 million riding on the outcome, but the chance for
the case to affect future competition had largely passed.
To be clear, this is not to say that the outcome of a case like
this one “doesn’t matter.” As discussed in Part I, the public likely
has an interest in seeing that the costs and benefits of the patent
system are allocated properly, and that interest includes the
proper administration of both backward- and forward-looking
remedies.197 But that is a different theory of the benefits of patent
litigation, one with its own limitations and uncertainties.198 The
theory that patent challenges increase competition requires that
the challenged patent be an ongoing source of market power,199
and this condition does not hold once a case becomes entirely
about the allocation of liability for past infringement.
Standing alone, the presence of a damages claim does not
mean a challenge lacks potential benefits for competition. But
whenever a damages claim is present, it is dangerous to assume
that a patent remains competitively significant simply because
the parties continue to fight over it. And this appears to be the
case in the majority of patent suits. According to data from Lex
Machina, among non-Hatch-Waxman patent cases in which a
Westlaw at 2012 WL 3647793); Brief of Defendant-Appellant Terex Corporation, Metso
Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution, Ltd, Case Nos 2011-1572, 20121168, 2012-1169, *8–10 (Fed Cir filed Aug 2, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL
3647794). To be sure, prevailing on its obviousness argument allowed Powerscreen to
avoid both damages and the injunction. But the appellants’ choice to focus on damages
without even questioning the injunction reveals something about the comparative significance of each remedy.
195 See Plaintiff Metso’s Motion for Pre-judgment and Post-judgment Interest, Metso
Minerals, Inc v Powerscreen International Distribution Ltd, Case No 06-cv-01446, *6–7
(EDNY filed Mar 25, 2011).
196 The damages found by the jury related only to sales through the end of fact discovery
in 2007. However, the court made clear that it intended to later remedy Powerscreen’s subsequent infringement as well. See Metso’s Motion for Attorney Fees at *1 (cited in note 178).
197 See Part I.C.
198 See Part I.C.
199 See Part II.A.1.
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remedy was granted, money damages were awarded approximately 77 percent of the time.200 Therefore, to ignore the possibility that damages may be the reason a dispute continues is to overlook a complicating factor present in more cases than not.
There are, however, categories of cases to which this objection
does not apply. For example, in Hatch-Waxman challenges,
money damages were awarded in less than 3 percent of cases litigated through the remedies phase,201 so the presumption that a
Hatch-Waxman case involves a question of prospective entry is
generally correct. Similarly, challenges brought by licensees who
continue to pay royalties while the suit is pending (sometimes
called “nonrepudiating licensees,” since they do not repudiate
their license agreements) will not typically involve claims for
damages.202 But both of these categories constitute a small percentage of all patent cases.203
It is worth noting that two of the more recent Supreme Court
patent opinions to espouse the value of patent challenges were in
cases that happened to belong in these exceptional categories:
challenges instigated by nonrepudiating licensees (MedImmune,
Inc v Genentech, Inc204) and challenges brought pursuant to
Hatch-Waxman (Actavis205). Neither case therefore involved any
claims of past infringement. This may explain why the posture of
prospective entry has become a common way to frame the benefits

200 Specifically, in patent cases filed between 2000 and 2015 not involving Hatch-Waxman
challenges and containing both a litigated judgment and a remedy, district courts entered
permanent injunctions (with no damages) in 119 cases, awarded money damages (with no
injunction) in 205 cases, and provided both remedies in 203 cases. Thus, money damages
were awarded in 408 out of the 527 cases (or 77 percent) in which a litigated judgment was
followed by a remedy.
201 According to data from Lex Machina, in patent cases filed between 2000 and 2015
involving Hatch-Waxman challenges and containing both a litigated judgment and a remedy, district courts entered permanent injunctions (with no damages) in 107 cases, never
awarded money damages without an injunction, and provided both remedies in 3 cases.
Thus, money damages were awarded in 3 out of the 110 cases in which a litigated judgment was followed by a remedy.
202 See Part III.B.
203 As discussed in note 171, Hatch-Waxman disputes represent a tiny fraction of the
patent cases filed each year. The exact percentage of patent challenges brought by nonrepudiating licensees is unknown, but appears to be in the single digits at most. See Cotropia
and Lemley, 87 NC L Rev at 1442, 1446 (cited in note 171) (observing that complaints
alleged a prior business relationship with the defendant in only 5.2 percent of cases). Challenges by nonrepudiating licensees would necessarily be a subset of this already small
group of cases.
204 549 US 118, 134–36 (2007).
205 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2227–30. But see Medtronic, Inc v Mirowski Family Ventures,
LLC, 134 S Ct 843, 851 (2014).
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of patent challenges, notwithstanding the atypicality of such
cases.
D. The Patent Challenge Is Successful
The final condition necessary for a patent challenge to increase competition turns on outcome: the challenger has to win. The
point is a simple one (and has been made before206). An otherwiseperfect challenge—one in which the patent confers market power,
with no other obstacles to competition, and with significant forwardlooking competitive effects—does not reduce market power if the
patent holder emerges victorious.
But even this seemingly simple condition requires qualification. As other scholars have noted, in some instances, the outcome
of a challenge may be a partial victory for the patent holder and
a partial victory for consumers.207 For example, even in a case in
which the patent is found valid and infringed (and thus the challenger loses), a narrow claim construction that occurs along the
way can reduce the scope of the disputed patent and potentially
reduce its competitive significance going forward. In the other direction, a case in which the patent is found valid but not infringed
(and thus the challenger wins) may turn out to be a less-thancomplete victory for consumers. Because the patent remains in
force, it lingers on to potentially raise the costs and restrict the
activities of other firms in the market. Invalidity judgments are
special in that they completely free the public of the prospective
effects of the patent.208 When that is not the outcome of a case, a
challenge may deliver something less than its full procompetitive
potential.
There are limits to what can be accomplished by recognizing
this condition, since the outcome of a challenge is not known in
advance. But still, there are two consequences worth noting.
First, the expected benefits of a challenge must be discounted to
206 Indeed, of all the conditions necessary for a patent challenge to increase competition, this one has by far enjoyed the widest recognition. See, for example, Actavis, 133 S
Ct at 2234; In re Cipro, 348 P3d at 864; Hemphill, 109 Colum L Rev at 634 (cited in note 45);
Elhauge and Krueger, 91 Tex L Rev at 290 (cited in note 47); Farrell and Shapiro, 98 Am
Econ Rev at 1349–50 (cited in note 47); Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley, 87 Minn L Rev at
1759–60 (cited in note 111); Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 Fla L Rev 747, 780 (2002).
207 See Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 649 (cited in note 18); Ford, 99
Cornell L Rev at 109–10 (cited in note 18); Parchomovsky and Stein, 113 Colum L Rev at
1513–20 (cited in note 18).
208 See Blonder-Tongue, 402 US at 349–50.
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reflect the chance that it will not succeed. This is not a trivial factor. When patent challenges are litigated to a final decision, the
underlying patents are found valid slightly more than half the
time.209 And, unfortunately, the costs of a challenge are incurred
with certainty, regardless of the outcome. So, even after all the
other necessary conditions are accounted for,210 the expected benefits for competition must be further discounted based on this
dependency.
The second consequence is that not all patent challenges are
created equal. While the outcome of a challenge cannot be known
in advance, it may be possible to estimate its chance of success,
which is an important factor in its expected value to the public.
When it comes to allocating scarce resources to additional patent
challenges, interventions that direct attention to the cases in
which success is more likely will tend to produce greater benefits
for competition, all else equal.
***
As discussed above, the primary benefit of patent challenges
cited by courts and commentators depends on a series of conditions that are only sometimes present. When one or more of these
conditions are lacking—when a patent does not confer market
power, the patent’s owner enjoys redundant sources of technical
exclusion or market power, the patent challenge is not resolved in
time, or the challenger loses—the patent challenge may fail to deliver its promised benefits for competition.
Evaluated individually, it is possible that each condition
holds in the vast majority of cases. But problematically, all of
these conditions must hold for a patent challenge to increase competition. This conjunctive relationship—the fact that the promised public benefits can be lost by a single one of these individually reasonable assumptions failing—greatly increases the risk
that a given patent challenge will not produce any benefits for
competition at all. For purposes of illustration, suppose that each
of the four conditions holds 90 percent of the time. The probability
209 See Allison and Lemley, 26 AIPLA Q J at 205 (cited in note 155) (finding a 54 percent
validity rate); Allison, Lemley, and Schwartz, 92 Tex L Rev at 1787 (cited in note 50) (finding
a 57.6 percent validity rate). Challengers are somewhat more successful on arguments of
noninfringement, see Allison, Lemley, and Schwartz, 92 Tex L Rev at 1788 (cited in note 50),
but for the reasons discussed above, the competitive effects of those victories are likely less
significant. See note 53 and accompanying text.
210 See Parts II.A–C.
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that all four will hold in a given case—assuming independence—
is given by (0.9)*(0.9)*(0.9)*(0.9). Thus, a collection of individually
reasonable assumptions might together hold only about 65 percent of the time.
It is difficult to put a number on how frequently each condition fails.211 But the available empirical evidence suggests not
only that each condition can fail, but also that each does so in
nonnegligible numbers of cases. Moreover, even in cases in which
all the necessary conditions are present, these same factors may
substantially limit the magnitude of the available benefits. For
example, even when a patent challenge is resolved in time to provide some benefits for competition, the passage of days may have
reduced the size of those benefits to a fraction of their original
potential. Add in the effect of a firm’s patent portfolio, and the
benefits are reduced further still. As a result, there are likely
many cases in which the most commonly cited benefit of patent
challenges either is completely unavailable or has significantly
smaller magnitude than previously assumed.
It is worth noting that the empirical understandings motivating these objections have become known only quite recently. For
example, the Supreme Court acknowledged the problems of assuming patents confer market power in 2006.212 The significance
of patent portfolios was recognized in the legal literature starting
only in 2005.213 Many of the data cited regarding the timing and
outcomes of patent challenges were published in that era as
well—some of it only in the last few years.214 Viewed in this light,
the century-old view that patent challenges reliably increase competition was perhaps reasonable at the time it was originally
adopted. But recent empirical evidence reveals that the conventional view hews much closer to patent theory than it does to the
reality of contemporary patent litigation.
III. IMPLICATIONS
As discussed in Part II, the prediction that patent challenges
result in increased competition relies on several implicit assumptions, and these assumptions do not always hold. To the contrary,
211 The final condition—that the challenge be successful—is the exception here, because there are precise data available regarding the rate at which patent challenges succeed. See note 209 and accompanying text.
212 See generally Illinois Tool Works, 547 US 28.
213 See generally Parchomovsky and Wagner, 154 U Pa L Rev 1 (cited in note 124).
214 See notes 146–48, 153.
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there are identifiable categories of cases in which the benefits of
increased competition are smaller than previously thought or
completely unavailable. This Part explores the consequences of
this complication for the long-held view regarding the procompetitive benefits of patent challenges.
Throughout this discussion, it should be remembered that
this Article is focused on a specific theory about the benefits of
patent challenges—that they increase competition by removing or
reducing unjustified market power. There are other potential benefits the public might plausibly obtain from patent litigation, and
it is possible that these benefits justify policies designed to encourage challenges (or discourage their settlement).
Even so, the existence of thin spots in the dominant theory of
how patent challenges benefit the public has a number of consequences. Long-standing patent doctrines have been rooted in the
public’s interest in free competition, and the conditions introduced in the prior Part raise new questions about these doctrines’
ability to serve their stated purpose. Accepting the stated goal of
increasing competition as a legitimate one, there may be ways
that goal can be better served. For example, if there are substantial benefits for competition available in some challenges but not
others, it may be valuable to steer resources to the cases in which
these benefits are most likely.
These implications span the legislative, judicial, and administrative domains. Part III.A evaluates whether the administrative patent challenge mechanisms created by the America Invents
Act are likely to increase competition. Part III.B considers a subset of patent challenges long favored by the Court—those brought
by existing licensees—and exposes several weaknesses in this judicially created policy. Part III.C evaluates the Hatch-Waxman
Act and several other bounty systems more recently proposed by
commentators to determine whether the challenges induced by
these policies are likely to benefit competition. Part III.D considers how antitrust law should regard patent settlements, particularly in light of the Court’s 2013 decision in Actavis.
A. Administrative Review under the AIA
One of the most significant patent reforms in recent years was
the expansion of postissuance review procedures in the Patent Office under the 2011 AIA.215 As the Supreme Court has explained,
215

See AIA § 6, 125 Stat at 299–313.
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the purpose of these new procedures is not simply to “resolve . . .
disputes among parties,” but to “help[ ] protect the public’s paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies are kept within
their legitimate scope.”216 This Section briefly introduces the new
procedures and evaluates how they compare with ordinary patent
litigation in terms of their ability to produce benefits for competition.217
The two primary innovations of the AIA are post-grant review (PGR) and inter partes review (IPR). PGR allows a party to
challenge a patent on any grounds in the first nine months after
a patent issues.218 The process begins by a challenger filing a petition identifying the specific claims he believes to be improperly
issued and paying a fee. The patent owner then has three months
to respond with any arguments as to why PGR should not be instituted.219 The Patent Office has three months to consider the petition,220 and may institute a PGR only if the petition “demonstrate[s]
that it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”221
If the Patent Office institutes PGR, the question of the claims’
validity goes to trial before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB), an administrative court composed of administrative patent
judges.222 From this point forward, the proceedings are similar to
litigation in district court, with several important distinctions.
First, the challenger need show unpatentability only by “a preponderance of the evidence,” as compared to the “clear and convincing” standard applicable in district court challenges.223 Second, discovery is “limited to evidence directly related to factual
assertions advanced” by a party,224 somewhat more restrictive
216 Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v Lee, No 15-446, slip op at 7–8, 16 (US June 20,
2016) (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted) (discussing inter partes review).
217 It should be noted that the stated purposes of these reforms also included
“mak[ing] the patent system more efficient and improv[ing] the quality of patents and the
patent system.” America Invents Act Report at 48 (cited in note 16). Therefore, increasing
competition may be an important benefit of these procedures, but it should not be regarded
as the exclusive measure of their success.
218 35 USC § 321. For a lengthier introduction to these procedures, see generally
Dolin, 56 BC L Rev 881 (cited in note 16).
219 35 USC § 323; 37 CFR § 42.207(b).
220 35 USC § 324(c).
221 35 USC § 324(a). The Patent Office may also grant PGR to resolve “novel or unsettled legal question[s]” relevant to other patents. 35 USC § 324(b).
222 See 35 USC §§ 6(a), 326(c).
223 Compare 35 USC § 326(e) with Microsoft Corp v i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S Ct
2238, 2242 (2011) (applying the “clear and convincing” standard).
224 35 USC § 326(a)(5).
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than the standard applicable in district court.225 Third, the PTAB
is required to reach a decision within twelve months (extendable
to eighteen months when “good cause” is shown).226
The other significant challenge mechanism created by the
AIA is inter partes review.227 IPR is, in many ways, similar to
PGR, with three important distinctions. First, under IPR, a challenger can argue unpatentability only on the basis of lack of novelty or obviousness in view of prior patents or printed publications.228 Therefore, other legal requirements for patentability
(such as indefiniteness, enablement, and patentable subject matter) are beyond the scope of the review.229 Second, and in contrast
to the short window for requesting PGR, the IPR process is available essentially anytime.230 Third, the threshold required to institute
IPR is slightly lower—a challenger need only show “a reasonable
likelihood of success.”231 The statutory timeline and other burdens
of proof are the same.232
As discussed above, one way a challenge in district court may
fail to increase competition is by coming too late and taking too
long. In this regard, PGR has a significant advantage that increases the likelihood it will deliver benefits for competition: by
law, it must be initiated (if at all) early in the patent’s life—within
nine months of the patent’s issuance.233 So even if resolution takes

225 Compare 35 USC § 326(a)(5) with FRCP 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”).
226 35 USC § 326(a)(11). Another difference, not relevant here, is that a patent owner
may amend her claims during the course of PGR. 35 USC § 326(d).
227 Technically, inter partes review is a modification of and replacement for inter
partes reexamination. See AIA § 6(a), 125 Stat at 299–304.
228 35 USC § 311(b).
229 Compare 35 USC § 311(b) with 35 USC § 321(b) (defining the scope of PGR).
230 The only timing constraint is that IPR cannot be filed until after the window for
PGR has closed and any PGRs that were filed have reached conclusion. See 35 USC
§ 311(c).
231 35 USC § 314(a). See also The Patent Reform Act of 2011, S 23, 112th Cong, 1st
Sess (Jan 25, 2011), in 157 Cong Rec 3428 (Mar 8, 2011) (statement of Sen Kyl) (characterizing the standard to institute PGR as “slightly higher” than the standard to institute IPR).
232 Compare 35 USC §§ 311–19 with 35 USC §§ 321–29. A third procedural mechanism, called “covered business method review,” is in many ways a hybrid of the two, allowing any argument for invalidity (like PGR) at any time in the patent’s life (like IPR).
See Dolin, 56 BC L Rev at 920–22 (cited in note 16). However, it is limited to certain technology areas and is available only if the challenger has already been sued or “charged with
[ ] infringement.” Id.
233 35 USC § 321(c). However, the opportunity for PGR reopens after a patent has
been reissued, which does introduce the possibility of late-in-life challenges. See 35 USC
§ 321(c).
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a few years, a successful challenge will necessarily clip a significant amount of patent term. There remains a risk that the patented technology will become obsolete before then, but the early
challenge requirement helps on this front, too. Moreover, a
shorter period for damages to accumulate increases the likelihood that a PGR will be rooted in future value rather than past
liabilities.234
The same cannot be said of IPR, for which there is no deadline
for filing a petition.235 Therefore, the window for IPR is similar to
that of civil litigation, with all of its risks of late-term (or even
postterm) adjudication.236 Indeed, in the first six months that the
IPR procedure was in place, the average patent age at the time of
petition filing was seven years and three months237—roughly comparable to the age of patents that are challenged in district
court.238 Moreover, initial observation suggests that there will be
a long tail of very old patents in the IPR process, just as there is
in traditional litigation.239
The promised, headline benefit of PGR and IPR is speed.240
By law, the Patent Office must resolve either form of review
within twelve months of its initiation (although, as noted above,
the Patent Office can extend this by an additional six months).241
However, it is slightly misleading to focus solely on that timeline,
since up to six months may be spent determining whether PGR
234 Unfortunately, this potential benefit is largely mooted by the alternatives of bringing either an IPR or a district court challenge at any time after that. The legislative history
suggests that these alternatives were preserved out of a concern that in some industries
it may be impractical to bring challenges so early in a patent’s life. See Matal, 21 Fed Cir
Bar J at 602 (cited in note 16).
235 In fact, a number of authorities appear to contemplate IPR of expired patents. See
37 CFR § 42.100(b) (“A claim in an unexpired patent shall be given its broadest reasonable
construction in light of the specification of the patent in which it appears.”) (emphasis
added); In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 F3d 1297, 1301 (Fed Cir 2015) (Prost
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[W]hen claims in post-grant proceedings . . .
have expired, the broadest reasonable interpretation standard does not apply.”).
236 Civil litigation can similarly begin after a patent expires, due to the trailing statute of limitations for patent infringement. See 35 USC § 286.
237 See Harnessing Patent Office Litigation: A Look at the First Six Months of Inter
Partes Review Proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office;
9/16/2012 to 3/16/2013 *2 (Harness Dickey), archived at http://perma.cc/5KLU-N3DS
(“First Six Months of Inter Partes Review”).
238 See Lanjouw and Schankerman, 32 RAND J Econ at 135 (cited in note 89) (estimating that 45 percent of case filings occur within seven years of the application date).
239 In the first six months of the Patent Office’s new IPR procedures, the oldest patent
was nearly eighteen years old at the beginning of proceedings. See First Six Months of
Inter Partes Review at *2 (cited in note 237).
240 See Matal, 21 Fed Cir Bar J at 622 (cited in note 16).
241 See 35 USC §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11).
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or IPR should be instituted at all.242 Once the time for this “preinstitution” business is considered, the total time from the filing
of a petition to a decision by the PTAB can take up to eighteen
months—or twenty-four months, in cases in which the Patent Office
grants itself an extension. And the PTAB’s eventual decision on
the merits is itself subject to (nonexpedited) appellate review by
the Federal Circuit.243
In the early days of these procedures, the Patent Office has
been using almost all of the time allowed by statute. For example,
during the first year of IPR, the median time from the filing of a
request for IPR to the issuing of a final written decision was 532
days—just shy of the eighteen-month maximum.244 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Patent Office’s work started fast and has been
gradually slowing down as more requests have been filed. 245 During the same time period, the Patent Office issued approximately
99 percent of its written decisions within nineteen months of an
initial request,246 but it is possible that the numbers could slip
further if the Patent Office begins granting a substantial number
of extensions for cause.
Another factor that will determine whether these procedures
yield benefits for competition is the frequency with which they are
invoked against patents that are but-for sources of market
power.247 On this front, there are reasons to fear that IPR and
PGR may be no better than traditional patent litigation. First, the
lower costs of IPR and PGR may reduce the private value necessary to justify continuing a dispute, which may actually make it
less likely that a challenged patent confers market power.248 For
242

See 35 USC §§ 313–14, 323–24.
See Dolin, 56 BC L Rev at 915–19 (cited in note 16). Moreover, because PGR and
IPR proceedings address only validity, not infringement, there may still be issues in a
challenge that require litigation after the proceedings have run their course. Id at 918–20.
244 Data courtesy of Lex Machina. The following data are based on IPRs filed from the
opening of the process in September 2012 until November 1, 2013. The 2013 cutoff is necessary to avoid overrepresentation of cases that resolved quickly.
245 For example, in the first six months of IPR, the Patent Office made grant decisions
within an average of fifty-four days. See First Six Months of Inter Partes Review at *2
(cited in note 237). Over time, that number has risen to seventy-six days. See Harnessing
Patent Office Litigation: A Look at Thirty Three Months of Inter Partes Review Proceedings
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office; 9/16/2012 to 6/16/2015 *2 (Harness
Dickey), archived at http://perma.cc/D9V4-C782.
246 Data courtesy of Lex Machina.
247 See Parts II.A–B.
248 The median attorney’s fees from filing to PTAB hearing are about $275,000 per
side, significantly less than the $600,000 to $5 million of district court litigation. See
AIPLA 2015 Report at 37–38 (cited in note 37).
243
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example, it is possible that the lower cost of an IPR might lead to
more challenges motivated by holdup or nuisance value instead
of the competitive significance of the patent itself.249 Second, as
with district court challenges, these procedures could be used as
tools in larger, portfolio-level fights that do not necessarily turn
on the significance of individual patents.250 (In the early days of
these procedures, scholars have already observed cases in which
IPRs appear to have been used for retaliation or extortion.)251
Third, in the case of IPR, the prospect of a challenge late in a patent’s
life raises the possibility that a dispute may be driven by past
liabilities rather than future control. As a result, it appears quite
possible that these procedures will be invoked (at least sometimes) to challenge patents that do not actually confer market
power.
These administrative challenge procedures do have several
important advantages over district court litigation. Recall that a
challenge’s expected benefits for competition turn significantly on
its likelihood of success.252 Ordinary civil litigation rules do not
screen out weak cases very aggressively, allowing a challenger to
impose (and incur) the costs of a challenge even if it has a very
low chance of success on the merits.253 The AIA’s new procedures,
by contrast, are conditioned on a more meaningful front-end
screen: an IPR challenge may proceed past the petition stage only
if the Patent Office determines that success is “reasonably
likely”254—or, in the case of PGR, that success is “more likely than
not.”255 The drafters of the AIA intended these thresholds to be

249 Professor Gregory Dolin has detailed a number of potential ways that these procedures can be abused. See generally Dolin, 56 BC L Rev 881 (cited in note 16).
250 See id at 944–45.
251 See id at 932–34, 944–47.
252 See Part II.D.
253 Pleading a patent case is typically a straightforward exercise, and surviving summary judgment simply requires creating a genuine dispute as to a material fact. See FRCP
56(a). The elevated pleading standards of Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544
(2007), and Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 US 662 (2009), were not immediately applied in patent
cases, see In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing System Patent Litigation, 681
F3d 1323, 1334 (Fed Cir 2012), but this was recently changed by action of the Judicial
Conference. See Jennifer H. Burdman and William J. Sauers, The State of Patent Law:
The Interplay of Recent, Pending, and Proposed Changes, 27 Intel Prop & Tech L J 9, 10–
11 (Oct 2015). Nonetheless, Twombly’s plausibility standard remains a significantly lower
bar than the thresholds for PGR and IPR.
254 See 35 USC § 314(a).
255 35 USC § 324(a).

2002

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1943

demanding, and expected that very few patents subjected to IPR
or PGR would turn out to be valid.256
Although these thresholds were apparently motivated by concerns about overburdening the Patent Office,257 they may also
have the previously unappreciated benefit of channeling scarce
resources to the challenges that promise greater expected public
benefits. If the high bars to instituting PGR or IPR dissuade parties from filing weak petitions, then challenges with a low probability of providing public benefits will not even begin (at least not
in this particular forum).258 If challengers take their chances anyway, the private and public costs of disposing of an unlikely challenge are significantly smaller: the costs of an IPR terminated at
the petition stage are less than a tenth of the costs of a patent
case decided by a district court on summary judgment.259 So, if the
legal standards for instituting PGR and IPR petitions are implemented properly, they may work to channel resources away from
long shot challenges and toward the challenges that are most
likely to succeed.
In this regard, the data from the early days of IPR are promising.260 In the first few years, the Patent Office has instituted IPR
in about 70 percent of the petitions filed.261 However, this high
256

See Matal, 21 Fed Cir Bar J at 607–09 (cited in note 16); 112th Cong, 1st Sess
(June 22, 2011), in 157 Cong Rec E1184 (June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep Smith) (“Very
few patents that undergo [PGR] are likely to be valid patents.”); 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in
157 Cong Rec 3375 (Mar 7, 2011) (statement of Sen Sessions) (“[T]he bill will allow the
PTO to avoid accepting [IPRs] that were unlikely to win in any event.”).
257 See Matal, 21 Fed Cir Bar J at 607–09 (cited in note 16).
258 To be sure, there may very well be cases in which the expected public benefits are
substantial despite a low probability that the challenge will be successful. For example, a
challenge to the patent on a blockbuster drug might promise hundreds of millions of dollars of expected benefits, even if it has only a low (say 10 percent) chance of invalidating
the patent. The argument here is not that low-probability challenges should be barred
entirely, but that the high thresholds to institute PGR and IPR may helpfully tend to direct resources toward high-probability challenges.
259 According to self-reported data by practitioners, the median cost through the petition stage of IPR was $80,000. See AIPLA 2015 Report at 38 (cited in note 37). In district
court cases with $1 million to $10 million at risk, the median cost of litigating through the
end of fact discovery was $950,000. Id at 37.
260 It is too soon to have meaningful data on PGR. As of July 31, 2016, only a handful
of PGRs had been filed. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board Statistics *3–4 (US Patent and
Trademark Office, July 31, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9DRR-2UFS (“July 2016
PTAB Statistics”).
261 See id at *7–8. In fiscal year 2015, 801 petitions for IPR were granted and 426
were denied (a 65 percent grant rate). In fiscal year 2014, 557 petitions for IPR were
granted and 193 were denied (a 74 percent grant rate). Id. In fiscal year 2013, 167 petitions
for IPR were granted and 26 were denied (an 86 percent grant rate). Patent Trial and
Appeal Board Statistics *7 (US Patent and Trademark Office, June 30, 2015), archived at
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institution rate appears to be the result of strong petitions rather
than lax application of the standard. According to the most recent
summary of IPRs completed to date, only 15 percent of final written decisions upheld all claims, while a full 70 percent of final
written decisions found all instituted claims unpatentable.262 Or,
to look at it slightly differently, of the 14,458 claims that have so
far been subject to a final written decision, approximately 81 percent have been found to be not patentable during IPR.263 That is
a substantially higher rate of invalidation than the much more
resource-intensive process of district court litigation.264 (Ordinarily, a comparison between the outcomes of one process and the
outcomes of a different process could be dismissed as a product of
selection effects, but here selection effects are actually the point:
the IPR process appears to be focusing litigation resources on
challenges with a higher probability of success than typical district court cases.)265
This advantage is compounded when one considers that not
all successful challenges are created equal—some outcomes can
produce only slight benefits for competition (such as a finding of
noninfringement), while others are more likely to produce significant competitive effects (such as a finding of invalidity).266 Moreover, as Professor Roger Ford has explained, there are a number
http://perma.cc/G6NP-PBC7 (“June 2015 PTAB Statistics”). Thus, the average grant rate
across these years was 70.3 percent, though the number has been trending downward.
262 July 2016 PTAB Statistics at *10 (cited in note 260).
263 Id at *12. An additional 2,123 claims were cancelled or disclaimed by their owners
before reaching a final written decision. Id. Note that a significant number of claims for
which IPR was instituted did not actually reach a final written decision, likely due to settlement. See id at *10, 12. Through July 31, 2016, this was the case for about 28 percent
of the claims for which IPR has terminated, and about 38 percent of cases. See id. Note
that this does not mean that IPRs settle at this rate. Because settled cases inevitably terminate more quickly than cases reaching a written decision, settled cases will be
overrepresented in the observed terminations to date. Still, given the high rate of patent
settlement in general, it is not at all surprising that some cases will settle between the
institution of an IPR and the completion of the trial.
264 See Allison and Lemley, 26 AIPLA Q J at 205 (cited in note 155) (finding that 46
percent of patents subject to a final validity decision were ruled invalid).
265 But, even still, there are other factors at work here that complicate the comparison. First, as noted above, once an IPR is instituted, a challenger has the benefit of a lower
burden of proof—more patents should be invalidated under a preponderance of the evidence standard than under a clear and convincing evidence standard. Second, during IPR,
the Patent Office construes claims more broadly (“broadest reasonable interpretation”)
than district courts do in litigation. See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, No 15-446, slip op at
7–8, 15–16. See also Dolin, 56 BC L Rev at 916 (cited in note 16) (discussing both practices). Finally, the option of settlement—in either district court or IPR proceedings—
makes it difficult to make any conclusive inferences from these statistics.
266 See Part II.D.
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of ways that district court litigation may encourage challengers
to make noninfringement arguments (with comparatively smaller
potential benefits for competition) over invalidity arguments.267
District court litigation is open not only to long shot arguments,
but to long shot arguments that are unlikely to have far-reaching
competitive effects.
Because PGR and IPR procedures can be used to challenge
only a patent’s validity, they focus litigation resources on the issues that are most likely to confer a public benefit for competition.
While arguments about the proper scope of an asserted patent or
a particular defendant’s noninfringement remain available in district court, these administrative review processes offer a cheaper,
faster mechanism to a party who is willing to bring a particularly
promising form of challenge—an invalidity argument against a
patent that in fact has a high likelihood of invalidity.
This analysis has several implications for how the Patent Office
should administer these proceedings going forward. First, speed
matters. Although the statute permits three months to rule on a
petition and twelve months to issue a written decision, there are
benefits to moving more quickly than that when possible. Moreover, the “good cause” standard for an extension of time should be
closely guarded, so as to prevent any further delays except when
strictly necessary. Finally, the Patent Office should institute
PGRs and IPRs cautiously, recognizing that its careful selection
of the most compelling petitions plays an important role in allocating scarce resources to the challenges most likely to increase
competition.
B. Encouraging Challenges by Licensees
One of the most significant judicial interventions to encourage patent challenges has been the “unmuzzling” of licensees under Lear, Inc v Adkins268 and its progeny.269 As the Court reasoned
in Lear, “Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor’s
discovery.”270 On this logic, otherwise-enforceable contracts and
long-standing equitable doctrines have been cleared away to enable
267

See Ford, 99 Cornell L Rev at 102–12 (cited in note 18).
395 US 653, 670–71 (1969).
269 See Standard Industries, Inc v Tigrett Industries, Inc, 397 US 586, 588 (1970)
(Black dissenting from the affirmance by an equally divided Court) (calling Lear a “major
change in the field of patent law”).
270 Lear, 395 US at 670.
268
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challenges by licensees, so that the public will not be “continually
[ ] required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need
or justification.”271 This Section evaluates the Lear doctrine’s ability to achieve its stated goal.
Prior commentators have disputed Lear’s premise that licensees possess an economic incentive to challenge the patents they
have licensed.272 However, the analysis of the prior Part raises a
more fundamental question for Lear: How likely is it that licensee
challenges, even when they are brought, will actually produce the
procompetitive benefits the Court assumed?
As a category, patent challenges by licensees have several
promising features. First, the posture of a challenge by a licensee
implies that there is an ongoing royalty arrangement between the
parties.273 This strongly suggests that a successful patent challenge would lower the licensee’s (and possibly other competitors’)
marginal costs going forward—and therefore likely lead to lower
prices for consumers in the future. Second, many of the complications raised above seem unlikely to apply in a case of a licensee
challenge. For example, it would be unwise for a licensee to break
with a licensor holding a large portfolio of critical patents, since
the licensee will need to successfully challenge all of them to pull
off the gambit. For this reason, it seems likely that a handful of
victories will be sufficient to free the licensee of the licensor. Similarly, under ordinary circumstances it is hard to see how breaching a license agreement would provide much holdup or nuisance
value. In sum, the posture of a typical licensee challenge suggests
a good chance of increasing competition and benefitting consumers if litigated to conclusion.

271 Id at 670–71. For Lear’s effects, see Warner–Jenkinson Co v Allied Chemical Corp,
567 F2d 184, 187–88 (2d Cir 1977); Panther Pumps & Equipment Co v Hydrocraft, Inc,
468 F2d 225, 230–32 (7th Cir 1972); Massillon–Cleveland–Akron Sign Co v Golden State
Advertising Co, 444 F2d 425, 427 (9th Cir 1971); Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc v Moraine
Products, 509 F2d 1, 6 (6th Cir 1974). See also MedImmune, 549 US at 135–36.
272 A larger number of commentators have opined that market incentives to challenge
patents will be inadequate. See, for example, Thomas, 2001 U Ill L Rev at 333 (cited in
note 18); Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 687–88 (cited in note 14); Malani and Masur, 101
Georgetown L J at 668–69 (cited in note 18); Farrell and Merges, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at
952 (cited in note 18); Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J Econ Persp at 88 (cited in note 18); Risch,
85 Ind L J at 1022 (cited in note 18); Parchomovsky and Stein, 113 Colum L Rev at 1487,
1513–14 (cited in note 18).
273 If the parties had agreed to a fully paid-up license, there would be no reason to
bring a challenge later on. Therefore, the existence of a licensee challenge implies an ongoing obligation to pay royalties.
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The fly in the licensee challenge ointment is timing. As discussed in the prior Part, the promised benefits for competition can
be lost if that challenge comes too late or drags on too long. And,
on this front, patent challenges by licensees do not appear so
promising.
Empirical studies on the characteristics of licensee challenges are sorely lacking. But there is reason to fear that these
cases will come later than average and may be especially prone to
resolution toward the end of (or after) a patent’s term. One reason
for this hypothesis is a practical consideration: there is a lot that
has to happen before a licensee challenge can arise. First, the potential licensor must identify the potential licensee and begin the
process of working out an arrangement. After that, both parties
must actually agree to terms—a process that takes time and may
involve a first round of patent litigation and settlement.274 Then,
circumstances must somehow change, such that the licensee now
finds it desirable to reopen a previously settled arrangement.275
Finally, the licensee must actually take the leap of mounting a
challenge, which may involve some amount of research and contingency planning before reigniting the dispute. With all of this
extra backstory, it seems likely that the typical licensee challenge
would involve a patent at least a few years older than the average
challenge brought by a nonlicensee.
In addition to these practical considerations, there are strategic reasons why licensee challenges might tend to occur very
near the end of the challenged patent’s life. As the Supreme Court
has observed, a licensee terminating its license to bring a challenge takes a number of significant risks. If the challenge is unsuccessful, the (former) licensee may no longer be able to serve its
existing customers.276 It may face treble damages for willful infringement.277 It may sacrifice a substantial portion of its prior
revenue stream.278 The benefits of a successful challenge may be

274 In some cases, this process of identification and negotiation takes place before the
licensed patent actually issues. See, for example, Lear, 395 US at 657–60. The St. Jude
license from the University of Michigan discussed later was similarly entered into prior to
issuance. See text accompanying notes 284–86.
275 In some cases, however, this change of heart could come about quickly. For example, after MedImmune, an accused infringer could take a license and then immediately
resume the fight as a nonrepudiating licensee. See notes 305–09 and accompanying text.
276 See MedImmune, 549 US at 133–34.
277 Id.
278 Id.
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substantial, but the consequences for a failed challenge can be
disastrous.279
One way a licensee can manage these downside risks is by
bringing a challenge late in a patent’s term. Doing so is still a
gamble—patent litigation is expensive, and the threat of treble
damages is real.280 But if the licensee can time the challenge so
that it is not resolved until after the patent’s term has run, the
licensee will not risk any interruption to its ability to sell the
product.281 Timed right, the risk of loss can be postponed until after the patented technology is in the public domain. In this way,
late challenges allow firms to take calculated gambles to reduce
their royalty payments without jeopardizing their ability to continue their existing activities.
The availability of this strategy also provides an answer to a
question that has puzzled commentators post-Lear: Why would a
licensee ever invest in a patent challenge? As others have noted,
doing so would seem to put the challenger at a disadvantage, because the firm mounting the challenge incurs its full costs, but its
competitors will frequently share in any future benefits.282 However, the answer to this may be a simple one: by bringing a challenge late in the patent’s term, the licensee can skip royalty payments while the case is pending and avoid conferring a benefit on
competitors, since, by the time the challenge is resolved, the invention would have been in the public domain anyway. Perversely, licensees may have an incentive to time their challenges
precisely so that the public benefits are minimized.283
279

Id.
Moreover, delaying a challenge reduces the upsides of success as well, since it
means more time spent paying royalties before contesting them.
281 This would not be true if there were a meaningful risk of a court entering a preliminary injunction against the licensee. However, given the Supreme Court’s policy of
encouraging licensee challenges, such an outcome appears extremely unlikely. Lear forbids requiring royalty payments from a licensee while a challenge is pending. See Lear,
395 US at 673. It would be quite surprising (and inconsistent with the reasoning of Lear)
for a court to enjoin the licensee during the same time period.
282 See Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 687–88 (cited in note 14); Farrell and Shapiro,
98 Am Econ Rev at 1349 (cited in note 47). Challenges to patent validity (as opposed to
arguments against infringement) seem especially unlikely, since a single invalidity judgment renders a patent unenforceable against the world. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc v University of Illinois Foundation, 402 US 313, 329 (1971).
283 In some cases, there may be rapid benefits for competition as soon as a challenge
is brought. For example, licensees who cease royalty payments at the beginning of a challenge may pass some of these savings on to consumers. As another example, nonlicensees
could enter the market in hopes that the challenge will eventually succeed. But because
the outcome of the challenge is uncertain until its conclusion, both of these groups will
need to make their pricing decisions with an eye on the possibility that the challenge will
280
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Without further empirical study, it is difficult to say how common this strategy may or may not be. However, it is easy to see
how the benefits of licensee challenges can be lost through delay.
Consider a recent dispute between the University of Michigan
and St. Jude Medical. Back in September 1997, St. Jude took an
exclusive license to the university’s patent pending method of
manufacturing synthetic heart valves.284 That agreement required St. Jude to pay 5 percent of its net profits on certain valve
products sold in the United States and a slightly lesser royalty
elsewhere.285 Soon thereafter, in May 1998, the University of
Michigan was awarded US Patent No 5,746,775 (the ’775 Patent).286
For nearly fourteen years, things went along smoothly
enough, with St. Jude apparently paying out millions of dollars in
royalties over time.287 Then, in 2011, a dispute over the calculation
of certain royalties broke out, and the university filed suit for
breach of contract about a year later.288 St. Jude unsurprisingly
counterclaimed for unjust enrichment and a declaration of invalidity.289 At the time, the ’775 Patent had about three years left in
its term.290
From there, a familiar story played out. St. Jude decided to
invoke the newly created IPR procedure and filed an IPR petition
in November 2012.291 Following the procedures described in the
prior Section, the university had a three-month opportunity to respond, and then the Patent Office had a three-month period to

end in failure—and that they may ultimately owe enhanced damages for each additional
unit they sold without paying royalties. See MedImmune, 549 US at 133–34.
284 Regents of the University of Michigan v St. Jude Medical, Inc, 2013 WL 673797, *1
(ED Mich).
285 Id.
286 See Robert J. Levy and Danielle Hirsch, Method of Making Calcification-Resistant
Bioprosthetic Tissue, US Patent No 5,746,775 (filed Oct 21, 1993).
287 Complaint, Regents of the University of Michigan v St. Jude Medical, Inc, Case No
12-cv-12908, *4 (ED Mich filed July 2, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 2839545) (discussing the alleged overpayment of $4.3 million for non-US royalties between 2009 and 2011).
288 Id at *3–5.
289 See St. Jude Medical Inc.’s Answer to First Amended Complaint of Regents of the
University of Michigan and First Amended Counterclaim by St. Jude Medical, Regents of
the University of Michigan v St. Jude Medical, Inc, Case No 12-cv-12908, *17–18 (ED Mich
filed Dec 17, 2012).
290 Because the ’775 Patent was filed in 1993 and issued in 1998, its expiration was
set for 17 years after issuance, or May 5, 2015. See 35 USC § 154(b).
291 See St. Jude Medical, Inc.’s Motion to Stay Pending the USPTO’s Inter Partes Review of the Validity of Patent No. 5,746,775, Regents of the University of Michigan v St.
Jude Medical, Inc, Case No 12-cv-12908, *4–5 (ED Mich filed May 6, 2013) (“St. Jude Medical’s Motion to Stay”).
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consider the petition.292 At last, the Patent Office instituted IPR
in May 2013.293 The parties took discovery. The PTAB heard argument. And, on the last day allowed by law, the PTAB issued a
written decision finding the challenged claims unpatentable. The
date was May 1, 2014294—about a year before the disputed patent
was set to expire.295
Unhappy with this result, the University of Michigan then
appealed the PTAB’s decision to the Federal Circuit.296 At this
point, the lackadaisical pace of an appellate court took hold, with
multiple extensions of time both requested and granted.297 While
the appeal was pending, the ’775 Patent expired.298 The passage
of time had mooted any forward-going consequences for competition, essentially cabining the stakes of the case to those of a simple contract dispute.
Notably, the Lear decision that sought to encourage licensee
challenges like this one did consider the effects of timing. In fact,
the reason the Court held that licensees should not be compelled
to pay royalties while a challenge is pending is that such a requirement “would give the licensor an additional economic incentive to devise every conceivable dilatory tactic in an effort to postpone the day of final judicial reckoning.”299 However, the Court
failed to notice that its rule gave both parties incentives to engage
in dilatory tactics. The patent holder and the challenger have an
interest in minimizing the opportunity for third parties to avoid
paying royalties as a result of the litigation. And the longer the
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See text accompanying notes 219–21.
St. Jude Medical’s Motion to Stay at *4 (cited in note 291).
294 See Patent Owner’s Notice of Appeal, St. Jude Medical, Cardiology Division, Inc v
Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, Case No IPR2013-00041, *2 (Fed Cir filed
June 27, 2014) (“University of Michigan’s Notice of Appeal”).
295 See note 290.
296 See generally University of Michigan’s Notice of Appeal (cited in note 294).
297 See Docket, Board of Regents of the University of Michigan v St. Jude Medical,
Cardiology Division, Inc, Case No 14-01723 (Fed Cir filed Aug 14, 2014).
298 Although the patent’s validity and assessment of any past royalties were still very
much live and contested issues, the parties elected to settle their dispute later that summer. See generally Stipulated Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and without Costs, Regents of the University of Michigan v St. Jude Medical, Inc, Case No 12-cv-12908 (ED Mich
filed Jun 25, 2015) (available on Westlaw at 2015 WL 10520394).
299 Lear, 395 US at 673.
293
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dispute drags on, the smaller will be the benefits the challenge
produces for everyone else.300
However, there is a discrete subset of licensee challenge that
avoids this problem entirely: challenges brought by nonrepudiating licensees. To put this distinction in context, the typical licensee challenge begins when the licensee ceases to pay royalties.301
The licensee may then seek a declaratory judgment or wait to be
sued for breach of contract and raise patent defenses in a counterclaim. In this paradigm (the “repudiating licensee”), the licensee gets immediate interim relief from its royalty obligations, and
the patent owner’s potential damages begin accruing right away.
This chain of events creates instant (and potentially substantial)
private stakes in the dispute, which can persist whether or not
the patent continues to have any relevance for future competition.
By contrast, in the case of a challenge by a nonrepudiating
licensee, the licensee continues to abide by the terms of the license
agreement, making royalty payments and complying with other
terms of that contract.302 But while remaining in good standing,
the licensee petitions for IPR or seeks a declaratory judgment on
its patent defenses.303 If the challenge succeeds, the licensee can
then cease paying royalties without consequence.304 But if the
challenge fails, the licensee does not face any liability for having
brought the challenge. In this way, damages do not accrue—the
licensee has not breached and is not an infringer—and the licensee sees a benefit only after the case is over.
Challenges by nonrepudiating licensees raise a host of concerns. Until the Supreme Court’s 2007 MedImmune decision,
there was a question whether courts enjoyed Article III jurisdiction in such a posture.305 (They do.)306 There is also something unseemly about a licensee attacking a patent while continuing to
enjoy the benefit of its license to that very patent. For this reason,
it is possible that long-standing equitable doctrines may preclude
300 There is a clear parallel here with the interest Hatch-Waxman litigants may have
in arranging their patent settlements in a way that minimizes consumer surplus. See generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 NYU L Rev 1553 (2006).
301 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives
to Innovate after MedImmune, 24 Berkeley Tech L J 971, 971–72 (2009) (explaining that
before MedImmune, licensee challenges had to begin with a breach of contract).
302 See MedImmune, 549 US at 137.
303 See, for example, id at 122–23.
304 See Dreyfuss and Pope, 24 Berkeley Tech L J at 975–76 (cited in note 301).
305 MedImmune, 549 US at 120–21.
306 Id at 131–32.
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these challenges completely—a question the MedImmune Court
did not reach.307 But, perhaps counterintuitively, challenges by
nonrepudiating licensees are actually more likely to increase competition than ones brought by licensees who first breach their
agreements.
Several features of the nonrepudiating posture assure that a
licensee’s interest in bringing a patent challenge will be closely
aligned with the public’s interest in competition. First, because
the nonrepudiating licensee does not get any benefit until the patented technology is in the public domain, such a challenger has
an incentive to move the process along as swiftly as possible.308
Moreover, this same feature builds in a check on the kinds of challenges that the licensee will pursue: if a technology is on the verge
of obsolescence, or the remaining term is so short that a challenge
cannot be completed in time to make much difference, that challenge will not be brought.309 And if a challenge starts out promising but goes south, the private interest in the suit will wane as
well. Because of this alignment between private interest and public significance, the challenges mounted by nonrepudiating licensees will almost always have the potential to increase competition.
But aside from this distinct subcategory, the prospects for licensee challenges to increase competition are not so bright. There
is an irony here. Since its inception, the Lear doctrine has been
concerned with creating private incentives for licensees to bring
patent challenges.310 But by assuming that a public interest in
competition is always present, the Court created a rule that allows patent suits to rapidly accumulate private value that can exist independently of any future importance for the disputed technology. Moreover, the same rule allows challengers to behave
strategically to avoid passing the benefits of the challenge along

307 Id at 135–36 (noting that “[r]espondents appeal to the common-law rule that a
party to a contract cannot at one and the same time challenge its validity and continue to
reap its benefits,” but finding the rule irrelevant to the question of Article III jurisdiction).
308 As the Lear Court noted, the patent holder may still seek to delay resolution, but
at least one party has an interest in moving the case forward. Lear, 395 US at 673–74.
309 For this reason, one would expect challenges by nonrepudiating licensees to be
brought near the beginning or middle of a patent’s life. For reference, the patent at issue
in the Court’s 2007 MedImmune decision is set to expire in 2018. See Shmuel Cabilly, et
al, Methods of Producing Immunoglobulins, Vectors and Transformed Host Cells for Use
Therein, US Patent No 6,331,415 (filed June 10, 1988); MedImmune, Inc v Genentech, Inc,
2007 WL 5760839, *3 n 2 (CD Cal).
310 See Lear, 395 US at 673–74.
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to competitors or consumers. As a result, the very licensee challenges Lear privileged seem to be particularly ineffective vehicles
for the doctrine’s stated goal of increasing competition.
C. Hatch-Waxman and Other Bounty Systems
Another major intervention to induce more patent challenges
was promulgated by legislation. One of the key features of the
1984 Hatch-Waxman Act was the creation of a regulatory bounty,
which holds out the promise of a potential duopoly to the first firm
to challenge a pharmaceutical patent. If that first-filed challenge
is successful, the challenger receives a 180-day exclusivity period
during which only it and the patent holder can sell the previously
patented drug.311 The purpose of this temporary duopoly is to
make it profitable for generics to challenge pharmaceutical patents and thereby increase the rate of such challenges.312 Extensive
study of the Act has shown that it has led to a substantial increase
in the number of patent challenges and a significant reduction in
prices for many drugs.313 This Section offers a few insights into
why Hatch-Waxman has been so successful in the field of pharmaceuticals and identifies several challenges with implementing
similar bounty programs in other technology areas.
Many scholars have recognized that the role of patents in the
pharmaceutical industry is a special one. Among all technical
fields, drug production is regarded as the one in which patents
play the most significant role in recouping research and development costs.314 In many ways, the economics of the pharmaceutical
industry very closely fit the conventional textbook theories of how

311 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). The two-step recipe of being (1) the first challenger and
(2) successful in that challenge is often (mistakenly) equated with being “the first successful challenger.” This is incorrect: if the first challenger loses and a subsequent challenger
succeeds, no regulatory exclusivity period is awarded. See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2235;
Hemphill, 81 NYU L Rev at 1583–86 (cited in note 300).
312 See Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 725 (cited in note 14); FTC Generic Drug Study
at *4–5 (cited in note 14).
313 See FTC Generic Drug Study at *8–9 (cited in note 14) (summarizing data);
Grabowski and Vernon, 10 PharmacoEconomics Supp 2 at 121 (cited in note 59); Panattoni,
30 J Health Econ at 132–33, 136 (cited in note 59).
314 See Richard C. Levin, et al, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research
and Development, 1987 Brookings Papers on Econ Activity 783, 816; Edwin Mansfield,
Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 Mgmt Sci 173, 180 (1986); Wesley M.
Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, and John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) *28 (NBER
Working Paper No 7552, Feb 2000), archived at http://perma.cc/L97X-94LB.
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patents are supposed to work. Developing new drugs is fantastically expensive.315 Without some form of legal protection, the costs
of copying would be low. Often, the metes and bounds of a
breakthrough can be well-defined, and exclusive rights to that
breakthrough confer market power sufficient to recoup the patent
owner’s investment. Because the field is already heavily regulated, detection of infringement is cheap, and enforcement is
highly effective.
On the flipside, these same distinctive characteristics—the
ways that drug patenting hews closely to the theoretical case for
having a patent system—cause Hatch-Waxman challenges to satisfy the conditions necessary to increase competition almost every
time. First, the technical scope of exclusivity afforded by a patent
frequently corresponds to a specific drug or treatment method
that a physician might order for a patient, and therefore confers
some degree of market power.316 Second, because secrecy is less
effective and redundant protections are slimmer than in other
fields, a successful challenge is very likely to put the underlying
treatment into the public domain.317 Third, because generics are
prohibited from entering the market until years after a challenge
has begun, Hatch-Waxman litigation is almost entirely about future control and very rarely involves liability for past infringement.318 The only common way completed Hatch-Waxman cases
fail to increase competition is by the patent owner prevailing in
court.319
In view of Hatch-Waxman’s success, a number of commentators have called for the creation of similar bounty systems to encourage challenges in other fields.320 However, as discussed in the
315 Exactly how expensive, though, is a matter of debate. See Burk and Lemley, The
Patent Crisis at 80 (cited in note 119).
316 Even when a number of largely undifferentiated treatment methods are available,
pharmaceutical patents appear to confer some market power. See Henry Grabowski, et al,
Does Generic Entry Always Increase Consumer Welfare?, 67 Food & Drug L J 373, 385–88
(2012) (describing the market for oral contraceptives and the effect of generic entry).
317 See notes 109–14 and accompanying text.
318 See notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
319 See Panattoni, 30 J Health Econ at 132–33, 136 (cited in note 59). The price and
quantity effects of generic entry following a successful Hatch-Waxman challenge have
been studied extensively. See generally, for example, Henry G. Grabowski and John M.
Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals after the 1984
Drug Act, 35 J L & Econ 331 (1992); Grabowski, et al, 67 Food & Drug L J 373 (cited in
note 316) (discussing price effects).
320 Note, however, that their arguments for doing so are not necessarily limited to
increasing competition. See, for example, Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 672
(cited in note 18) (arguing that invalid patents function as a tax on legitimate innovation
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prior Part, the characteristics that make Hatch-Waxman challenges likely to increase competition are not always present in
patent challenges generally. Therefore, to the extent a new
bounty initiative seeks to increase competition,321 it is critical that
the bounty induce the right kind of patent challenges. Otherwise,
it may simply lead to expensive litigation without producing the
claimed public benefit, or, worse, direct resources away from challenges that could have increased competition.322
Without careful design, it is possible that a bounty system
may induce challenges that are even less likely to increase competition than patent challenges in general. Recall that, for a challenge to increase competition, it must be directed at a patent that
confers market power.323 One can try to infer market power from
the fact of a patent challenge, but, as discussed above, there are
competing explanations for any given patent suit: it might be a
nuisance suit, a case of holdup, or an isolated salvo in a portfoliolevel fight.324 Introducing a cash prize for a successful challenge
further complicates the attempted inference, because it creates
the possibility that a challenger will show up to chase the bounty
without having much interest in the disputed technology itself. A
simple cash prize for defeating a patent will not necessarily draw
challenges to the most important patents, and may induce wasteful bounty-seeking litigation having nothing to do with the public’s interest in competition.
One way to address this concern is to tie the prize to some
measure of the value of the patented technology. For example,
Professor Joseph Scott Miller proposes that the size of the bounty
should be based on the patent holder’s past profits from practicing
the patented technology.325 This eliminates the problem of challenges to patents that were never commercially significant, but
introduces a different one: it may disproportionately induce challenges related to technologies whose commercial significance lies
completely in the past. At the beginning of a patent’s life (when a

by competing companies); Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 705 (cited in note 14). See also
Kesan, 17 Berkeley Tech L J at 763, 795–97 (cited in note 21).
321 This is a commonly cited goal of bounty proposals, but it is not the only one. Obviously, a bounty program designed for another purpose could be considered successful even
if it does not increase competition.
322 See Leslie, 91 Minn L Rev at 172 (cited in note 47) (noting that bounties risk inducing challenges to unimportant patents).
323 See Part II.A.
324 See Part II.A.2.
325 See Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 712 (cited in note 14).

2016]

Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?

2015

challenge could do the most good for competition), the patent
holder will have no past profits. As time goes on, the incentives to
challenge increase, and the public benefit decreases. Perversely,
the prize for invalidating a patent peaks only after the patent has
lost its legal or commercial significance. As a result, Miller’s proposal seems liable to induce the fiercest litigation over previously
valuable patents, rather than patents likely to affect the public’s
future interest in competition.326
There may very well be a public interest in encouraging litigation around previously valuable technologies, but it is not the
public’s interest in forward-going competition.327 If the goal is to
draw challengers to the cases most likely to affect future competition, the size of the bounty should turn on the future value of
the patented technology. However, this is much easier said than
done, for predicting the long-term significance of a technology is
widely recognized to be guesswork. (Miller acknowledges this difficulty as well; in fact, it is the very reason he recommends looking
to past value instead.)328 Moreover, for such a regime to work,
courts would not only need to determine future value accurately,
but they would also need to do so using a transparent and predictable methodology, so that potential challengers could assess
their expected payouts before bringing a patent challenge. This
further compounds the difficulty: the incentives created to challenge a patent will depend on potential challengers’ estimation of
how the court will estimate the future value of the underlying
technology—a two-step guessing game.329
326

Professors Anup Malani and Jonathan Masur propose a bounty based on “the period of valuable patent life . . . effectively at risk during the lawsuit”—including both past
and future years of potentially infringing activity. Malani and Masur, 101 Georgetown L
J at 662 n 105 (cited in note 18). Helpfully, this prevents the size of the bounty from peaking on the day a patent expires, but it nonetheless offers a private reward based partly on
past years’ activities—potentially even in cases involving expired patents. Thus, both the
Miller proposal and Malani-Masur proposal could lead to bounty-hunting cases in which
no future competitive consequences are at stake.
327 For example, there may nonetheless be a substantial public interest in the distributional consequences of cases involving expired patents or obsolete technology, see
Part I.C, and the bounties proposed by prior commentators might very well advance that
interest. The point here is only that bounties calculated based on past value cannot be
expected to induce the challenges that have the greatest significance for future competition.
328 See Miller, 19 Berkeley Tech L J at 719–20 (cited in note 14). See also Malani and
Masur, 101 Georgetown L J at 662, 672 (cited in note 18) (acknowledging that their assumption of constant value may over- or underestimate technological significance in future
years).
329 See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis,
23 J Legal Stud 307, 315–16 (1994) (noting that investments in ex post accuracy are valuable only to the extent that the relevant actors can predict the results ex ante).
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Here lies the genius of Hatch-Waxman: the size of the bounty
is determined by market mechanisms and with minimal judicial
or administrative discretion. Potential challengers can plan
around a predictable prize: a statutory period of 180 days of joint
exclusivity. At the same time, the value of that exclusivity depends directly on the future significance of the technology. If, by
the time the challenge is complete, the technology has no more
value, the bounty will not have any value either. If the technology
becomes more important with time, the value of the bounty increases with it. Hatch-Waxman’s prize is simultaneously simple
and dynamic.
Unfortunately, as good as this mechanism is for pharmaceuticals, there are several reasons it would be difficult to transplant
to other technology areas. First, in fields in which many patents
are involved in making a finished product, it is unclear how the
reward for challenging one of those patents should be divided to
reflect these overlapping sources of patent value. Hatch-Waxmanstyle exclusivity is simple when the loss of a single patent puts
the technology in the public domain, but it becomes substantially
more complicated when the competitive effects of a patent challenge are subtler.
More problematically, a reward of short-term exclusivity may
not be worth very much in industries in which patent enforcement
is expensive and imperfect. A successful Hatch-Waxman challenger gets its 180 days of actual joint exclusivity at no extra cost
because a well-funded government agency (the FDA) enforces this
exclusivity as part of an existing regulatory regime. But this
cheap, strong enforcement mechanism is the exception, not the
rule. FDA-regulated drugs are the only products for which entrants
are regularly required to sort out patent rights prior to entry.330 In
fields in which licensing prior to use is rare, enforcement is expensive, and infringement boundaries 0are hard to draw, a shortterm right may be of little practical value. Within some range, a
policymaker could counteract these obstacles by lengthening the
time of the bounty exclusivity, but this comes at the price of delaying
and reducing the public’s benefits from the successful challenge.

330 See Aidan Hollis, Closing the FDA’s Orange Book, 24 Reg 14, 15–16 (Winter 2001);
Panattoni, 30 J Health Econ at 127 (cited in note 59). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark
D. Janis, and Mark A. Lemley, Balancing Ease and Accuracy in Assessing Pharmaceutical
Exclusion Payments, 88 Minn L Rev 712, 716 (2004). The requirement to address patent
rights as part of the FDA approval process extends to drugs intended for animals, but does
not reach medical devices. Compare 21 USC § 360b with 21 USC § 360e.
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Simply put, in the many fields in which the exclusive rights of
patents do not function like clean on/off switches, it may be impractical to use those exclusive rights to define the prize for a successful challenge.331
Perhaps there are other fields besides pharmaceuticals in
which the market mechanism of Hatch-Waxman-style exclusivity
can be successfully implemented. However, the design of a patent
bounty system is a humbling undertaking, and it should not be
assumed that expanding the Hatch-Waxman model to other industries will produce similar results.
D. Antitrust and Patent Settlement
Another area that has recently drawn a significant amount
of attention is the antitrust analysis that should apply to the settlement of patent challenges. It has long been established that
restraints contained in a patent settlement can potentially run
afoul of the antitrust laws, just as they can in any agreement.332
It is a separate question, however, whether the loss of the patent
challenge itself might be a harm cognizable under the antitrust
laws. Despite the urging of commentators that antitrust law
should be invoked to discourage certain patent settlements,333
courts were historically hesitant to find antitrust harm within the
exclusionary scope of presumptively valid patent rights.334 But in
Actavis, the Supreme Court moved the law distinctly in that direction, raising a number of questions about how future antitrust
courts should think about the loss of potential competition as a
result of a patent settlement. This Section evaluates the conditions necessary for a settlement to work this particular form of
anticompetitive harm, and concludes that caution is advised before applying Actavis as expansively as some have urged.

331

See Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J Econ Persp at 87–90 (cited in note 18).
See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2232 (collecting cases); Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s Actavis Decision, 15 Minn J L Sci & Tech
3, 18–19 (2014).
333 See, for example, Elhauge and Krueger, 91 Tex L Rev at 283 (cited in note 47);
Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive
Illegality, 108 Mich L Rev 37, 67–75 (2009); Hemphill, 81 NYU L Rev at 1612–16 (cited in
note 300); Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley, 87 Minn L Rev at 1720–21 (cited in note 111);
Lemley and Shapiro, 19 J Econ Persp at 90–95 (cited in note 18); Shubha Ghosh, Beyond
Hatch-Waxman, 67 Rutgers U L Rev 779, 783 (2015).
334 See, for example, United States v Singer Manufacturing Co, 374 US 174, 196–97
(1963); United States v Masonite Corp, 316 US 265, 277 (1942).
332
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A bit of background is necessary to introduce the holding of
Actavis and how it is likely to affect antitrust scrutiny of settlements in the future. The case arose in the distinctive context of a
Hatch-Waxman challenge, with several generic manufacturers
seeking to defeat a pharmaceutical patent.335 Though a successful
challenge would have given the first generic challenger 180 days
of joint regulatory exclusivity (and the other challengers the ability to enter the market after that), the generic challengers instead
opted to settle for a significant cash payment from the patent
owner.336 Such an arrangement is called a “reverse-payment settlement,” because the payment went from the patent holder to the
patent challengers (the opposite of how settlement payments usually go). In return, the generic firms dropped their challenges and
agreed not to enter the market until much later in the patent
term.337 The Federal Trade Commission brought suit alleging that
this agreement violated the antitrust laws; the district court and
Eleventh Circuit, however, held that the defendants’ decision to
end the case was immune from such scrutiny, since its anticompetitive effects (if any) were exclusively within the scope of the
patent.338
In allowing the FTC’s claim to proceed, the Supreme Court
declined to hold these arrangements either per se legal or per se
illegal. Instead, it instructed lower courts to employ antitrust
law’s rule of reason.339 But the Court also seemed to go further
than that, stating in dicta that certain settlements could be presumed anticompetitive. In the words of the Court:
An unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally
suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s
survival. And that fact, in turn, suggests that the payment’s
objective is to maintain supracompetitive prices to be shared
among the patentee and the challenger rather than face what

335 Under the framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act, these prospective manufacturers
initiated the challenge by certifying to the FDA that their proposed generics would not
infringe the relevant patent and that, in any event, the patent was invalid. See Actavis,
133 S Ct at 2227–30; 21 USC § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). This certification technically constitutes
infringement, see 35 USC § 271(e)(2)(A), creating a basis for a patent suit in which infringement and validity can be adjudicated. See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2228–29 (explaining
this statutory scheme).
336 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2227.
337 Id at 2229.
338 Id at 2229–30.
339 Id at 2227, 2237.
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might have been a competitive market—the very anticompetitive consequence that underlies the claim of antitrust
unlawfulness.
...
In sum, a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can
bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive effects. 340
Such a payment, the Court explained nearby, has the “potential
for genuine adverse effects on competition,”341 because it
“amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to
sell its product, a right it . . . [might] lose if the patent litigation
were to continue.”342 Commentators have dubbed this the “Actavis
Inference”—the proposition that a settlement agreement containing a large, unexplained payment to a challenger creates an inference of both market power and cognizable antitrust harm. 343
Much has been written regarding the application of antitrust
law to Hatch-Waxman settlements.344 These debates need not be
recounted here, for the complications raised in the prior sections
are for the most part not relevant in the case of a Hatch-Waxman
challenge. (As discussed above, various features of pharmaceutical patenting and its accompanying regulatory regime ensure
that these challenges will typically be directed at patents that are
but-for causes of prospective market power.)345 But nothing explicitly limits Actavis to Hatch-Waxman challenges,346 and the potential
effects of the case on other forms of patent settlement are significant.

340

Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236–37.
Id at 2234, quoting Federal Trade Commission v Indiana Federation of Dentists,
476 US 447, 460–61 (1986).
342 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234.
343 Aaron Edlin, et al, The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 Rutgers U L Rev
585, 585 (2015). See also Joshua P. Davis and Ryan J. McEwan, Deactivating Actavis: The
Clash between the Supreme Court and (Some) Lower Courts, 67 Rutgers U L Rev 557, 578–
79 (2015); Rebecca S. Eisenberg and Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How FDA and Antitrust Courts Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with Patents, 21 Mich
Telecomm & Tech L Rev 197, 235 (2015).
344 See generally, for example, Bruce H. Kobayashi, et al, Actavis and Multiple ANDA
Entrants: Beyond the Temporary Duopoly, 29 Antitrust 89 (Spring 2015); Aaron Edlin, et
al, Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to Critics, Antitrust Source 1 (Oct 2014); Carrier, 108
Mich L Rev 37 (cited in note 333). See also Hemphill, 81 NYU L Rev at 1612–16 (cited in
note 300); Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley, 87 Minn L Rev at 1749–63 (cited in note 111);
Crane, 54 Fla L Rev at 747 (cited in note 206).
345 See Part III.C.
346 While nothing in the Court’s opinion explicitly limits this rule to Hatch-Waxman
challenges, in a few places the Court seems to assume that only Hatch-Waxman challenges
will be affected by its holding. See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2227, 2230.
341
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Throughout the Actavis opinion, the Court invokes assumptions that are generally sound in the context of Hatch-Waxman
challenges but that are problematic if applied elsewhere. For example, the Court seems to assume a one-to-one relationship between patents and products.347 It assumes a successful challenge
would put the patented technology in the public domain.348 It
assumes that the dispute’s private value arises from monopoly
power and that the but-for world is one of perfect competition.349
And it invokes a hypothetical challenge resolved a decade before
the disputed patent expires.350 Given all of this, a number of problems emerge if the opinion is applied to non-Hatch-Waxman cases
for which the Court’s simplifying assumptions no longer hold.351
The potential for error will depend significantly on how the
language quoted above is ultimately understood. Because Actavis
appears to establish an inference of market power and anticompetitive effects in cases involving unjustified reverse payments, it
will be critical for future courts to define what exactly counts as a
“reverse payment.”352 Clearly, a naked transfer of cash from the
patent owner to the challenger qualifies. But “reverse payment”
will likely be understood to include other things as well. Consideration can come in many forms, and it would seem quite blinkered to watch only for wire transfers flowing in the wrong direction.353 Rather, commentators have suggested that detecting
reverse payments will require evaluating the entire bundle of
commitments made in a settlement and looking for unjustified
consideration flowing from the patent holder to the challenger.354
This could come in any number of forms: agreeing to perform services at below-market rates, promising not to compete in other
product lines, or offering a discount on royalties or damages.355
347

See id at 2234.
Id.
349 Id at 2235.
350 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234.
351 Several commentators, pre- and post-Actavis, have argued that scrutiny of patent
settlements should not be limited to pharmaceutical cases. See, for example, Elhauge and
Krueger, 91 Tex L Rev at 285 (cited in note 47); Ghosh, 67 Rutgers U L Rev at 796–97
(cited in note 333).
352 See Michael A. Carrier, Payment after Actavis, 100 Iowa L Rev 7, 9 (2014); Aaron
Edlin, et al, Activating Actavis, 28 Antitrust 16, 16 (Fall 2013).
353 See Edlin, et al, 67 Rutgers U L Rev at 592 (cited in note 343); Davis and McEwan,
67 Rutgers U L Rev at 568–70 (cited in note 343). Indeed, the Government’s brief and
Chief Justice John Roberts’s dissent explicitly anticipated this extension. See Actavis, 133
S Ct at 2245 (Roberts dissenting).
354 See Edlin, et al, 67 Rutgers U L Rev at 601–02 (cited in note 343).
355 Id at 595–601.
348
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Though the full extent of what may constitute a reverse payment
is still being developed, the majority of courts that have confronted this question have already expanded Actavis beyond the
simple case in which the patent holder pays cash.356
Even if this rule is sensible enough in cases involving HatchWaxman challenges, defining reverse payments to include noncash consideration could render Actavis incredibly far-reaching if
applied to patent settlements in general. Because the typical patent plaintiff seeks both damages and an injunction,357 a settlement agreement will need to address both matters as well. The
danger is that almost any settlement could expose the parties to
an allegation that the resolution of damages includes a hidden
reverse payment. Patent damage calculation is a famously uncertain art,358 and the number agreed on for settlement purposes will
almost always be smaller than what the plaintiff might have
claimed at trial. Any disposal of a damages claim—again, conspicuously lacking in most Hatch-Waxman cases—at a perceived discount could turn a traditional “forward” payment into the kind of
reverse payment from which Actavis might infer anticompetitive
effects.
For example, consider a patent challenge with a 50 percent
chance of success. A defendant facing $100 million of potential
damages for its past infringement might happily agree to settle
for $50 million to cap its liability and avoid the expense of trial.
For similar reasons, the patent holder might prefer a guaranteed
$50 million over a chance of winning $100 million, and trial costs
are saved on its end, too. For both sides, a settlement like this one
reduces uncertainty and expense. This is the traditional and perhaps least exciting kind of settlement, in which the parties strike
a bargain somewhere in between the plaintiff’s best possible outcome and the defendant’s best possible outcome and avoid the expense and risks of trial.
But a court applying a broader definition of reverse payment
might perceive trouble here. Comparing the $50 million settlement to the $100 million damages claim, the patent challenger
has in fact received a $50 million “discount” on its damages liability

356 See In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litigation, 94 F Supp 3d 224, 242 (D Conn 2015)
(collecting cases).
357 See note 200 and accompanying text.
358 See Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 Nw U L Rev
115, 117–18 (2015) (describing the challenges of assessing patent damages).
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in exchange for dropping the challenge. That is valuable consideration flowing from the patent holder to the challenger, and
could constitute an implicit reverse payment, even as the currency transfer flows the other way. Once such a reverse payment
is perceived, the Actavis framework would then give the parties
the opportunity to explain why they settled for $50 million rather
than the full $100 million. But the opinion itself offered only two
acceptable answers: litigation costs avoided and services rendered.359 Neither can save the parties in this example. The litigation costs avoided might explain $2 million of the implicit reverse
payment,360 and there are no services rendered by the patent challenger, leaving the parties with an unexplained $48 million reverse payment. And although the Court did not mention any other
acceptable explanations for an apparent reverse payment, it did
strongly suggest that the one the parties could truthfully give
here—the uncertainties of prevailing at trial—would be a wrong
answer.361 In fact, it is exactly such payments to avoid the chance
of losing at trial that the Court sought to discourage.362
This Article is not the first to observe that implicit reverse
payments can be found in traditional settlements of cases involving claims for past damages.363 In fact, the Actavis Court was explicitly aware of this possibility, and claimed that it had no intention of disturbing the conventional understanding that such
damages discounts were not a cause for antitrust concern.364 But
there is reason to doubt the Court’s commitment to this supposed
distinction. First, its holding appears to open the door to this very
result. Unless reverse payments are limited to cash transfers (a
rule that could be easily circumvented365), the potential to perceive implicit reverse payments in cases involving damage claims

359 See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236; Edlin, et al, 28 Antitrust at 18 (cited in note 352);
Eisenberg and Crane, 21 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 235–36 (cited in note 343).
360 See AIPLA 2015 Report at I-115 (cited in note 37) (reporting attorney’s fees in
Hatch-Waxman litigation).
361 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236–37. See also Davis and McEwan, 67 Rutgers U L Rev at
578 (cited in note 343).
362 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236.
363 See, for example, Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 Antitrust L J 1033, 1048 (2004); Crane, 54 Fla L Rev at 776
(cited in note 206). See also Asahi Glass Co v Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 289 F Supp
2d 986, 994 (ND Ill 2003).
364 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2233. See also id at 2243 (Roberts dissenting).
365 See text accompanying notes 353–55.
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is pervasive.366 So while the Court disclaimed any intention of capturing such settlements, the logical extension of its rule would
seem to do exactly that. Second, and perhaps more tellingly, the
Court does not explain why the traditional ability to settle damage claims at a discount should be preserved in the first place. If
failure to litigate a claim results in a loss of potential competition,
what difference does it make whether the settlement takes a more
foreign or familiar form? On the Court’s own reasoning, preserving the ability to settle patent cases in the traditional way seems
rather arbitrary or, at best, like a nod to the need for incremental
change.367
This is where the observations of the prior Part are significant—they can explain why parties should ever be permitted to
settle patent claims, and for reasons that are more satisfying than
preserving tradition alone. The simple answer is that patent settlements avoid significant costs, to the parties and others, and
that the expected benefits for competition they forfeit are in many
cases small to begin with. To be clear, this is not an answer the
Court would give, in light of its long-standing assumption that
patent challenges save the public from being “continually [ ] required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.”368 But as the prior Part discussed, patent challenges
are not as reliably procompetitive as courts and commentators
have assumed.
To illustrate, consider again the $50 million settlement of the
$100 million damage claim introduced above. Everyone would
agree that this damages discount is attributable to some question
about the patent’s scope or validity—in other words, there was
some chance that the challenger might have won her case.369 But

366

This is not to say the result is inevitable. For example, Professor Michael Carrier
has proposed a test that would distinguish between damage forgiveness and other compensation. See Carrier, 100 Iowa L Rev at 7 (cited in note 352). But this is Carrier’s construction, not the Court’s, and in any event he would still subject damage forgiveness to
some level of scrutiny. Id at 35, 44–47.
367 This tension did not escape the Actavis dissent, which noted, “[W]hen a patent
holder licenses its product to a licensee[,] . . . surely it takes away some chance that its
patent will be challenged by that licensee. According to the majority’s reasoning, that’s an
antitrust problem that must be analyzed under the rule of reason.” Actavis, 133 S Ct at
2245 (Roberts dissenting). See also Crane, 54 Fla L Rev at 774–76 (cited in note 206) (concluding that the form of settlement cannot reliably distinguish pro- and anticompetitive
agreements).
368 See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2233, quoting Lear, 395 US at 670.
369 See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2236.

2024

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1943

contrary to Actavis,370 that does not mean that the purpose of the
settlement was to maintain monopoly profits. In fact, without
knowing significantly more, it is impossible to determine whether
this settlement had any effect on competition at all. This could be
a case of holdup, with the damages driven entirely by inadvertent
infringement rather than the value of the underlying technology.371 The technology could be obsolete by now; for that matter,
the patent itself could be expired.372 The challenger may have
stood no chance of ever using the technology without infringing
other rights of the patent holder, whether or not she had prevailed
in this particular challenge.373 There could be any number of
portfolio-level explanations and complications to the otherwisesimple tale of patent damages settled at a discount.374
The sobering conclusion here is that the analysis necessary
to properly assess the competitive effects of patent settlements is
substantially more complex than previously appreciated. Prior to
Actavis, many courts had concluded that even inquiring into the
likelihood of a patent challenge’s success was too much to ask—
that “[t]he antitrust game . . . would not be worth that litigation
candle.”375 Indeed, the Actavis Inference itself was an attempt
to avoid exactly such an undertaking. 376 As Professors Rebecca
Eisenberg and Daniel Crane have observed, “Everybody seems to
agree that reviewing the merits is too much for the courts to swallow—they disagree only over whether the default position should
be antitrust immunity or liability.”377
But the merits of a patent challenge are not even the half of
it. To be sure, in order to accurately assess the competitive promise of a (settled) challenge, a court would indeed need to evaluate
its likelihood of success.378 But it would also need to consider
whether the challenged patent conferred forward-going market
370

See id.
See text accompanying notes 96–98.
372 See text accompanying notes 142–43.
373 See notes 111–20 and accompanying text.
374 See notes 124–38 and accompanying text.
375 Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2234.
376 See id at 2236.
377 Eisenberg and Crane, 21 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev at 237 (cited in note 343).
To be clear, Eisenberg and Crane are summarizing only the opinions of courts and the
FTC; a number of commentators (including Crane) have suggested that antitrust courts
will need to spend some time exploring the merits of the underlying patent claims. See, for
example, Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley, 87 Minn L Rev at 1759–60 (cited in note 111);
Crane, 54 Fla L Rev at 780–82 (cited in note 206).
378 See Part II.D.
371
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power.379 It would need to evaluate whether a successful challenge
would actually have reduced that market power.380 And it would
need to assess the likely time frame in which any competitive benefits could have been obtained, had the claim proceeded.381 Answering these questions would likely require inquiry not only into
the strength of the challenged patent, but also into any number
of overlapping and competing intellectual property rights as well.
All of this suggests extreme caution is in order when applying
Actavis. The opinion left lower courts substantial discretion to
fashion the presumptions and burdens of proof applicable in these
cases.382 If history is any guide, there is reason to fear that the
long shadow of Hatch-Waxman may significantly affect how these
rules develop, even if they apply to cases having nothing to do
with Hatch-Waxman at all. Indeed, the Actavis Inference itself is
rooted in assumptions that do not reliably hold outside the highly
regulated and distinctive domain of pharmaceuticals. To avoid
this result, courts should be mindful that Hatch-Waxman challenges are in many ways exceptional, and should announce presumptions only after giving extensive thought to how they will
operate in the many industries in which the function of patents
does not hew so closely to the theoretical models found in economics textbooks.
CONCLUSION
For nearly a century, courts have assumed that patent challenges benefit the public by increasing competition. This claim
appears to be rooted in a belief that the patent system operates in
practice as it is supposed to work in theory. But a wealth of recent
scholarship has shown that the real-world operation of the patent
system is significantly more nuanced than simple models of the
economic effects of the patent system allow. When patents no
longer function as binary monopoly-on/monopoly-off entitlements, the effects of removing patent rights become substantially
more complicated.
This Article has described a number of ways that the assumptions underlying the simple models can fail. In identifiable categories of cases, the benefits of patent challenges for competition
379

See Part II.A.
See Part II.B.
381 See Part II.C.
382 See Actavis, 133 S Ct at 2237–38. See also Hovenkamp, 15 Minn J L Sci & Tech at
23–24 (cited in note 332).
380
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may be small. In some cases, these benefits may not be available
at all. Therefore, policies intended to increase competition by encouraging patent litigation may fail on their own terms if they do
not yield the right kind of patent challenges. All patent cases are
not created equal, and their significance for competition can
change radically over time.
However, it is important to recognize the limits of the present
analysis. First, as noted above, there may be other public benefits
produced by patent challenges, and these benefits may justify policies to encourage litigation even in cases offering little (or no)
chance of increasing competition. These alternative theories
about the potential benefits of patent litigation are the subject of
future study. As a result, this Article does not reach any conclusion about whether there is too much or too little patent litigation
in general.
Finally, it should be emphasized that this Article evaluates
the competitive effects of patent challenges, not patents. The fact
that a particular patent challenge cannot affect competition does
not mean that the underlying patent did not harm competition in
the first place. For example, in the case of a challenge that fails
to increase competition because it was resolved late in the patent’s life, it is quite possible that the challenged patent caused a
lot of harm to competition during its useful life—judicial scrutiny
simply came too late to mitigate the damage. As a result, it would
be wrong to equate skepticism of the value of patent litigation
with skepticism of the value of patent examination. In fact, the
limited ability of patent litigation to reduce the ex post costs of
patent grants might suggest a need for more scrutiny prior to issuance by the Patent Office—another topic for future study.

